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Art is individualism, and individualism is a disturbing and
disintegrating force.
There lies its immense value. For what it seeks to disturb is monotony
of type, slavery of custom, tyranny of habit, and the reduction of man to the
level of a machine.
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INTRODUCTION
The term synergy is contemporarily used—some may say
annoyingly overused—to explain a phenomenon in which the
skills, efforts, and unique personality traits of two or more
individuals are combined, resulting in a situation that is more
beneficial than it would have otherwise been had the
individuals not connected.2 Whereas synergistic connections
necessarily, then, entail a collective human approach, it is often
forgotten that when stripped to their core components, they are
composed first and foremost by the individual elements that
underlie and energize them. In other words, without the
individual—albeit in a plural form—there cannot exist any
collection, or synergy, of beneficial human traits.
It necessarily follows, then, that the favorable traits of
each individual comprising the synergistic sum model must
somehow first be cultivated, nurtured, and refined before the
individual is able to connect with and positively contribute to
the differently beneficial traits of various others. It is the
primary business of philosophers, psychologists, and other
behavioral science experts to study and analyze human value
systems that engender the most optimal forces which must
exist and coalesce in society in order to cultivate the most
positive—and, thus, synergistic—life experiences for the most
individuals as possible.
In his article, Individualism and Interdependence, Alan S.
Waterman debunks the common critique held by numerous
contemporary psychologists that a value system founded upon
principles of individualism leads to unscrupulous competition,
atomistic self-containment, and alienation.3 Indeed, as will be
discussed herein in greater detail, the subject of whether a
societal model distinctly based on the doctrine of individualism
will beget human behavior which is both productive and
satisfying to individuals, as well as to society as a whole, has
1. BRUCE BASHFORD, OSCAR WILDE: THE CRITIC AS HUMANIST 143
(1999).
2. See, e.g., Synergy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster
.com/dictionary/synergy (last visited Jan. 24, 2017).
3. See Alan S. Waterman, Individualism and Interdependence, 36 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 762 (1981) [hereinafter Waterman, Interdependence].
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been in rigorous debate as far back as the Gilded Age of the
late nineteenth century.4
In his later book on the subject, The Psychology of
Individualism, Waterman analyzes the then-existing body of
research which examined various personality traits universally
attributed to individualism for the purpose of determining
whether it represents “optimal psychological functioning” or
whether its critics are correct that it is “a contributor to
personal and social disorganization.”5 The results of the
detailed and meticulous empirical studies he embarks upon
overwhelmingly support Waterman’s thesis that “the
individualistic qualities of a sense of personal identity, self-
actualization, an internal locus of control, and principled moral
reasoning were shown to be associated with benefits to the
person and to society.”6
Waterman, thus, proceeds by offering his thesis that a
“synergistic societal ideal” can emerge by embracing these four
fundamental characteristics of individualism because they
ultimately result in a “compatible incorporation” of both the
interests of the individual and the mutual, collective well-being
of society.7 By providing a detailed account to his readers of
what he perceives as very strong support that such a societal
ideal will have the greatest chance of being achieved if all
persons were encouraged to apply the four characteristics of
psychological individualism, Waterman concludes with a hope
that his findings will spur future authors to further examine
the issue and provide “a more serious consideration of the
potential for individualism to contribute to the human good,” in
order that they should assist in moderating the contemporary
negative “rhetorical tone of the critiques.”8
In this article, I will enthusiastically embrace Waterman’s
endorsement of psychological individualism in the specific
4. See generally CLASS IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 376–77 (Robert
E. Weir ed., 2007) (“One can say . . . that American society continues to
grapple with how to best meet the needs of its citizenry—through relying on
individual initiative and personal accountability or through viewing
individuals as members of a collective whole within an economic and political
society charged with promoting the general welfare.”).
5. ALAN S. WATERMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INDIVIDUALISM 85 (1984)
[hereinafter WATERMAN, PSYCHOLOGY].
6. Id. at 169.
7. Id. at 167.
8. Id. at 169.
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context of copyright ownership. I will demonstrate that a
rational and ethically moral system of copyright authorship
and ownership can only be achieved by preserving the
individual rights of copyright owners, primarily because
“natural individual rights are a more basic foundation for
normative judgment than social codes could be, and . . . social
structures can be defended as legitimate only insofar as they
serve the interests and protect the rights of individuals.”9 I will
show, as Objectivist philosopher Ayn Rand poignantly warned
over fifty years ago in her novel, Atlas Shrugged, that a society
which shuns the individualistic efforts of creators, inventors,
and industrialists, “returns to a pre-nineteenth century level of
existence. Human life shortens in span—death comes more
quickly for all [as] the result of the mind on strike.”10
In the face of zealous academic opposition to the above
propositions among the vast majority of intellectual property
law scholars, I will nonetheless continue to bellow from the
ivory towers of the university with Zarathustra-like vigor—
along with a lone few of my colleagues—that copyright laws,
albeit imperfect, insanely complicated, and in many respects in
dire need of a modern recasting, “still serve a useful purpose
that advances the common good.”11 I shall take up the charge of
one of these legal mavericks, Professor Robert Merges, who in
his well-reasoned and refreshingly well-researched treatise,
Justifying Intellectual Property, calls for a multi-disciplinary
examination of the contemporary conundrum of IP ownership
in the wake of the digital age.12 Professor Merges encourages
the development of “a set of ideas, a vocabulary, that
transcends and ties together multiple foundational
conceptions” in order to ultimately preserve the individualistic
foundations of intellectual property ownership while
simultaneously seeking a just and balanced integration of
larger societal needs.13 That is what this article will attempt to
achieve in the context of copyright law, specifically arguing
9. JOHNWATT, INDIVIDUALISM AND EDUCATIONAL THEORY 57 (1989).
10. Debi Ghate, The Businessman’s Crucial Role, in ESSAYS ON AYN
RAND’S ATLAS SHRUGGED 315 (Robert Mayhew ed., 2009).
11. Richard A. Spinello, Beyond Copyright: A Moral Investigation of
Intellectual Property Protection in Cyberspace, in THE IMPACT OF THE
INTERNETON OURMORAL LIVES 29 (Robert J. Cavalier ed., 2005).
12. ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY xi (2011).
13. Id.
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that a synergy of both individual and collective benefits—of the
type promulgated by Waterman and a few other
psychologists—is already built into the existing scheme of
copyright ownership.
This article shall proceed in four parts. Focusing primarily
on the works of behavioral psychologists, Part I will begin with
a discussion of the vast differences between a human
behavioral model that aspires to embolden and empower the
individual, from one that encourages the individual to bow
submissively to what it perceives to be the higher and more
important needs of the collective or mass society. This part will
also demonstrate that the vast majority of psychologists today
continue to fight against the individualistic principles which
have historically shaped our government and legal system,
favoring instead a model of personality based on collectivist
canons. In Part II, I will show that copyright law—also
historically a doctrine which fosters individual efforts of
creativity—is similarly under attack by legal scholars who wish
to infuse collectivist precepts into the laws regulating the
production of works of authorship and their resultant
ownership. In the third Part, I will respond to the claims for
communitarian copyright by revealing that the true reason
why individual copyright ownership and the notion of the
genius author are under attack is due to what I term “copyright
envy,” or a pervasive desire to eviscerate all of those creative
traits which make up an individual author, ironically for the
very reason that the traits are good and serve good. In Part IV,
I will apply the four principles of individualism outlined by
Waterman to copyright ownership, and conclude that
continuing to foster a regime of rights that are exclusively held
and controlled by individual authors will ultimately result in
not only more and better works, but also will contribute to a
synergistic and happier society overall. Finally, I will conclude
this article, as I often do, with an appeal to my copyright
colleagues in the academy to seriously reconsider their
borderline obsessive fascination with their dream of
communitarian copyright ownership.
I. THE COMPETING PHILOSOPHIES OF INDIVIDUALISM
AND COLLECTIVISM
Individualism and collectivism have been defined as “a set
of shared beliefs and values of a people concerning the
relationship of an individual to aggregates or groups or
580 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 18:2
individuals. It represents the way individuals relate to others
in their society, and it reflects their emotional and cognitive
attachments to particular networks of individuals.”14 An
individualistic model results in the consequence of autonomous
work that is designed around the individual rather than group
work or participative decision-making.15 On the other side of
the coin, a collective societal model focuses primarily on
societal development as a whole before encouraging the
refinement of intrapersonal skills.16
Viewed within the complex context of economics,
individualism is often associated with capitalism, which
represents the antithesis of collectivism in the form of
communism or socialism.17 From an intrapersonal lens, it “has
come to acquire several different meanings: an ability to
exercise a degree of control over one’s life, the ability to cope
with one’s problems, an ability to change for the better, reliance
upon oneself, being responsible for one’s actions, self-fulfillment
and self-realization of one’s internal resources.”18
In the realm of politics, individualism is frequently viewed
as promoting smaller government, less welfare spending, fewer
taxes, and deregulation of business whereas the counter
political bent of collectivism is that government regulation is
“needed to address social problems, nurture community,
provide equal opportunity, and protect society from selfishness,
greed, and the power of privilege.”19 From a literary
14. MIRIAM EREZ & P. CHRISTOPHER EARLEY, CULTURE, SELF-IDENTITY
ANDWORK 95 (1993).
15. Id. at 96.
16. Michael L. Hecht & YoungJu Shin, Culture and Social and Emotional
Competencies, inHANDBOOK OF SOCIAL AND EMOTIONAL LEARNING: RESEARCH
AND PRACTICE 50 (Joseph A. Durlak et al. eds., 2015).
17. CLASS IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 4, at 375; see also
Donald Billings & Lawrence W. Reed, The Moral Case for Competitive
Capitalism, Revisited, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC. (May 13, 2016),
https://fee.org/articles/the-moral-case-for-competitive-capitalism-revisited/
(noting that capitalism, more than any other force, is responsible for the
universal acknowledgement of individuality, the freedom of choice, the
sanctity of contract and property rights and, ultimately, “the desirable
characteristics of a truly just and moral order”).
18. YUEH-TING LEE ET AL., PERSONALITY AND PERSON PERCEPTION
ACROSS CULTURES 194–95 (2013).
19. CLASS IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 4, at 376 (providing
examples of the intricacies of the political debate over collectivism and
individualism, and claiming that the lines between liberalism and
conservatism cannot be easily drawn within such debate).
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perspective, the reigning values of individualism are self-
reliance, self-ownership, freedom of contract, and autonomy—
traits overwhelmingly acclaimed by, and entrancingly woven
into the tales of, many of America’s most prolific and influential
early writers such as Emerson, Thoreau, Hawthorne, Melville,
and Twain.20 Even in the area of mythological studies,
prominent authors such as Joseph Campbell eloquently note
that “[f]ormerly—but in archaic cultures still—the way was to
subordinate all individual judgment, will, and capacities
absolutely to the social order: the principle of ego . . . was to be
suppressed”; however, today, the “humanistic individual has
released powers of creativity that have brought about in a mere
two centuries changes in the weal and woe of man such as no
two millenniums before had ever worked.”21
Regardless of the particular frame of reference from which
the contentious debate over individualism and collectivism is
recognized, it cannot be denied that a vast and seemingly
insuperable divide exists among the proponents of each diverse
theory, evincing a philosophical schism of overwhelming
proportions.22 On the one hand, many writers have argued that
espousing the philosophy of individualism will lead to a
denigration of the common good, a societal divisiveness and,
ultimately, to the alienation from one’s fellow human beings.23
On the far end of that spectrum, proponents of individualistic
convictions insist that such beliefs further “an aspiration
toward a self and a society that stand for something good and
that may even enhance existence.”24
It is also without doubt that—at least in academia—the
collectivist camp is today the clear winner in this debate, as the
tenets of individualism are “under the most severe attack in
many intellectual circles.”25 Indeed, “individualism has been
20. JUSTYNA FRUZIŃSKA, EMERSON GOES TO THE MOVIES: INDIVIDUALISM
INWALT DISNEY COMPANY’S POST-1989 ANIMATED FILMS 26–27 (2014).
21. JOSEPH CAMPBELL, THE MASKS OF GOD: OCCIDENTAL MYTHOLOGY
521–22 (1964).
22. LEE ET AL., supra note 18, at 195; see also GEORGE KATEB, EMERSON
AND SELF-RELIANCE x (2002) [hereinafter KATEB, SELF-RELIANCE] (describing
the dispute in terms of having “a history of deadlocked criticism”).
23. LEE ET AL., supra note 18, at 195.
24. GEORGE KATEB, THE INNER OCEAN: INDIVIDUALISM AND A
DEMOCRATIC CULTURE ix (1992).
25. Tibor R. Machan, The Fear of Individualism, FOUND. FOR ECON.
EDUC. (July 1, 1993), https://fee.org/articles/the-fear-of-individualism
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the object of sustained criticism and contestation. During the
past two centuries, very few important philosophers and social
theorists and the schools of thought that formed around their
teachings have abstained from taking individualism to task in
whole or part.”26 Legal academicians, too, are among those
leading the charge on a heightened attack against
individualism.27
Despite the deep chasm that separates the staunch
advocates of individualism on the one hand and collectivism on
the other, some authors astutely note that the debate will
never be resolved by a continued pitting of these two
philosophies against one another.28 Within the context of
organizational psychology and behavioral studies, Professors
Erez and Earley have maintained that
[p]erhaps the most reasonable conclusion is that all individuals have
self- and group interests; culture influences which of these interests
will manifest themselves in a particular setting. Throughout
childhood and adolescence the collectivist is reinforced and rewarded
for cooperative actions with group-focused outcomes, whereas the
individualist is rewarded for engaging in actions that have positive
personal outcomes. Rather than viewing self-and group interests as
opposing motives, we can view them as separately linked to
knowledge structures that are evoked in a culturally prescribed
fashion.29
The authors maintain that a “simple categorization” of
these groups of thought “can overlook numerous subtleties of
[hereinafter Machan, Fear of Individualism] (observing that, according to the
critics, individualism “is supposed to foster disloyalty to family, friends, and
country. It is supposedly hedonistic and instills antisocial sentiments in
people. It is allegedly purely materialistic, lacking any spiritual and cultural
values”); see also Tibor R. Machan, Individualism: The Collectivists’ Nemesis,
ALT.COM (May 2, 2014), http://www.alt-market.com/articles/2119-
individualism-the-collectivists-nemesis [hereinafter Machan, Collectivists’
Nemesis] (“Today some of America’s most powerful mainstream politicians
have gone on record denouncing individualism and they are joined by a great
many academicians, even some scientists, in trying to besmirch the idea.”).
26. KATEB, SELF-RELIANCE, supra note 22, at x.
27. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, The Core of Copyright: Authors, Not
Publishers, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 613, 613 (2014) (hereinafter, Gordon, The Core of
Copyright) (noting that a focus on authorial creation “is not very popular at
the moment” among commentators writing on copyright theory).
28. See, e.g., LEE ET AL., supra note 18, at 195 (citing authors such as
Sampson who “see no reason why the philosophy of individualism should not
also nurture a spirit of cooperation and coexistence”).
29. EREZ& EARLEY, supra note 14, at 94 (emphasis in original).
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behavior.”30 Compounded with this propensity to simplify, the
battle lines between the two camps are often rigidly drawn, as
is often the case today in political discourse in the media.31
Weir regrettably notes that individualism “is easily confused
with personal style and uniqueness, just as it is easily
stereotyped by its opponents as a smokescreen for selfishness.
Its fringe expressions—including radical capitalism, extreme
libertarianism, oppositional subcultures, and utopian
anarchism—also contribute to stereotyping.”32 Similarly, Erez
and Earley observe that a common misconception about
collectivism is that it “is synonymous with socialism and that
all collectivists are harmonious and homogeneous.”33
The debate among individualists and collectivists in the
field of psychology is not moving forward because each side is
deeply entrenched and, thus, unable to envision a more
tempered theory which applies a median between the myopic
extremes envisioned by each camp. Quite a similar chasm
exists among copyright experts who are pro-owner’s rights
versus those who believe that the rights of the public should
reign supreme. As further discussed below, the underlying
theme in this copyright-rights debate is also fundamentally one
which pits principles of individualism against those of
collectivism.
II. THE CALL FOR COLLECTIVISM IN COPYRIGHT LAW
Traditionally in the United States, intellectual property
law generally—and copyright law in particular—has developed
within a framework that embraces principles of individuality.34
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Richard Benedetto, CNN Political Reporter Not Happy About
Favorable Romney Coverage, FOX NEWS (Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.foxnews
.com/opinion/2012/10/29/cnn-political-reporter-not-happy-about-favorable-
romney-coverage/ (“There was a time when news reporters who covered
politics were expected to keep their partisan leanings or preferences to
themselves. That time is nearly gone.”).
32. CLASS IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 4, at 377.
33. EREZ& EARLEY, supra note 14, at 94–95.
34. Magnus Graner, Opening Remarks to the 2010 ATRIP Congress, in
INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVENESS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW xv
(Jan Rosén ed., 2012); see also MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE
INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 2 (1995) (“Copyright is founded on the concept of the
unique individual who creates something original and is entitled to reap a
profit from those labors.”); Anne Sechin, On Plagiarism, Originality, Textual
Ownership and Textual Responsibility: The Case of Jacques le Fataliste, in
584 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 18:2
The Progress Clause of the U.S. Constitution itself, which
empowers Congress to enact copyright laws for the benefit of
authors “explicitly recognizes that individual expression is
valuable in itself, deserving encouragement.”35 In fact, the
notion that authors own property in their work because it
“embodies their personal individuality predates even the
earliest copyright statute.”36 In one of the first copyright
infringement cases, Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,
the Supreme Court held that an original work “is the personal
reaction of an individual upon nature. Personality always
contains something unique. It expresses its singularity even in
handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it
something irreducible, which is one man’s alone.”37
Indeed, two of the major virtues of a philosophy of
individualism as claimed by its proponents include creativity
and originality.38 Originality, it will be recalled, is also the
legal standard by which copyright ownership is determined, as
Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 (the Act) provides
copyright protection only for “original works of authorship.”39
The legal determination of originality requires a mere
“modicum” or “spark” of creativity; it is also notoriously not an
assessment of the artistic or creative merits or societal worth of
a work.40
ORIGINALITY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE FRENCH AND ENGLISH
ENLIGHTENMENT 102 (Reginald McGinnis ed., 2009) (maintaining that the
emergence of originality as an aesthetic category and the legal birth of
intellectual property depend on the rise of individuality in the eighteenth
century); Jisuk Woo, Genius with Minimal Originality?: The Continuity and
Transformation of the “Authorship” Construct in Copyright Case Law
Regarding Computer Software, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 109, 112 (2004)
(noting that “authors generally have been thought of as individuals who are
solely responsible for creating unique works, a notion upon which the
conceptual system of copyright relies heavily”).
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Jacqueline Shapiro, Toward a
Constitutional Theory of Expression: The Copyright Clause, the First
Amendment, and Protection of Individual Creativity, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1043, 1045 (1980).
36. Alina Ng, Literary Property and Copyright, 10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 531, 539 (2012).
37. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903).
38. WATERMAN, PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 5, at 4–5.
39. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
40. ZOHAR EFRONI, ACCESS-RIGHT: THE FUTURE OF DIGITAL COPYRIGHT
LAW 35 (2011).
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Delving deeper into “the construction of ‘authorship’ shows
that the U.S. copyright law encompasses the notion of inherent
rights of creators generated by their creative activity in many
ways.”41 The “romantic” notion of copyright authorship—“that a
work is the expression of an author’s genius and an extension
of the author’s personality”—is the underlying assumption in
copyright law that “allows an author to exercise authorial
control to ensure the integrity of his self-expression.”42
Furthering this assumption, the basic structure of copyright
law today rests on the notion “that to achieve the public good,
the law should aim at private interest.”43 Waterman has echoed
this precept by observing that “the creations brought forth
through the expression of unique individual potentials are not
just for private use and appreciation, but may be to the benefit
of all. Such creativity appears to be facilitated by social
conditions that provide personal freedom and encourage the
difficult task of individuation.”44
41. Woo, supra note 34, at 110.
42. Shun-Ling Chen, Collaborative Authorship: From Folklore to the
Wikiborg, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 144, 144 (2011) (hereinafter Chen,
Collaborative Authorship); see also Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of
Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1063, 1064
(2003) (“Authors are the heart of copyright.”).
43. Michael D. Birnhack, The Idea of Progress in Copyright Law, 1 BUFF.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 3, 33 (2001).
44. Waterman, Interdependence, supra note 3, at 766; see also NATALIE F.
VISHNYAKOVA, THE ABCS OF CREATIVITY, TALENT, AND SPIRITUALITY 79
(2011) (“The creative individuality is expressed in singularity, originality, and
uniqueness, a creator’s personality and his ability creating new material and
spiritual values not only for himself alone, but for society as well. The creative
individuality manifests in originality, inventive power, brains and wit
initiative, creative thinking, acumen and savvy, all of which testifies about
talent of personality.”) (emphasis omitted). The complex Jungian process of
individuation, while well beyond the scope of this work, is briefly described by
one author as follows:
[O]ur psychological life’s work—becoming an integrated person, our
‘indivuation’—is to learn how that principle of order manifests in
us, to become more familiar with this Self that seems to influence
our behavior. This principle or force has been known as the inner
voice, a higher power, the dream-maker, the greater self, the
mysterious ‘other’ in our personality, the divine spark, the beloved,
or destiny; but whatever it is called, many people recognize that
something within them beyond their ordinary plans for themselves
influences their lives.
See DELDON ANNE MCNEELY, BECOMING: AN INTRODUCTION TO JUNG’S
CONCEPT OF INDIVIDUATION 3 (2010).
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Even though every new copyright author invariably
“stands on the shoulders of giants” by relying on the
accumulated creative ideas, accepted themes, and general
knowledge of authors of the past,45
[c]reativity is the art of the new, and it is the product of the
individual mind. As new creativity takes form, that cognitive
premise intersects with investigations into material culture and
social practice, including arguments over whether people create for
love or for money, whether and when creativity is cumulative, and
whether and when creativity is collective.46
It is, thus, hardly ever contested by contemporary legal
scholars (including this author) that the foundations of western
jurisprudence evident in the underlying constructs that form
the basis of copyright law in the United States are imbued with
individualist influence.47 Incredibly, however, the mainstream
of copyright academicians believe this fact to be an unfortunate
byproduct of a bygone era in which the individual creations of
authors were regrettably praised, admired, and vehemently
protected by the legal regime without much question.48 It can
readily be observed that the bulk of contemporary intellectual
45. Birnhack, supra note 43, at 41–44.
46. Michael J. Madison, Beyond Creativity: Copyright as Knowledge Law,
12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 817, 824–25 (2010); see also RICHARD A.
SPINELLO & MARIA BOTTIS, A DEFENSE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
127 (2009) (“To some extent, authors re-construct and re-shape the ideas they
have borrowed from others. But this fact does not deny the single author’s
irreducible as a creative catalyst, the conscious origin and source of a fresh
interpretation, a new work developed through hard labor that often entails
considerable imaginative input and sometimes advances the frontiers of
knowledge. In this creative process the author as human subject who acts with
intentionality endows a work with a certain meaning and stamps his or her
unique personality upon that particular work.”).
47. Chen, Collective Authorship, supra note 42, at 134 (noting that
current U.S. copyright law “is based on an individualist property regime”); see
also MERGES, supra note 12, at 3 (“Countless judges begin their IP decisions
with one or another familiar ‘stage setter’ about how IP protection exists to
serve the public interest, often intoning one of a few stock passages penned in
a spare moment by Thomas Jefferson. But these utilitarian platitudes quickly
give way to doctrinal details, which often show the unmistakable imprint of
something more fundamental, something beyond utility—revealing at the end
of the exercise, its real purpose and justification. That is, courts often wind up
talking about IP rights as rights.”) (emphasis in original).
48. See, e.g., LIOR ZEMER, THE IDEA OF AUTHORSHIP IN COPYRIGHT 2
(2007) (arguing that exclusively celebrating one individual copyright author is
disingenuous because it fails to attribute the true development of intellectual
property as a collective, societal construct that “depends on the consumption of
cultural and social properties”).
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property scholarship evidences a “general trend against
supporting individual rights” in favor of more collectivist
approaches, which are “predicated on a rejection of the idea
that people are really autonomous.”49 According to these
authors, “[o]ur attachment to individual property rights is
interpreted as symptomatic of the individualism at the core of
Western society that needs reappraisal and deconstruction.”50
Professor Margaret Chon has observed, for example, that
many “influential” scholarly articles are today “in favor of
collective authorship, including explicitly collaborative forms,”
evincing a “vision [that] substitutes collective for individual
genius as well as the individual cultural authority.”51 Professor
Lior Zemer believes that the notion of the Romantic creator is a
fiction because “creative works come about when authors and
the public collaborate.”52 He claims that “[t]he larger
community owns and nurtures these shared categories and
standards without which the creative act would be stunted.”53
Professor Carys Craig similarly claims that
it is a mistake to look to the relation between the author and her
work as the basis on which to justify the copyright system. In so
doing, we necessarily neglect the social and cultural goals of
copyright, and so wrongly augment the scope of the rights conferred
under copyright while failing to identify and draw appropriate
limits.54
Sadly, the students of these professors are now also
carrying the collectivist torch by continuing to promulgate the
absurd notion that the solo efforts known to be required in
order to create a great work of authorship are merely a “myth”
in that they represent an outdated eighteenth century ideology,
under which “the production of cultural artifacts is imagined as
an activity mainly accomplished by a single person—the
romantic author, whose genius gives birth to a work and who is
therefore rewarded with property rights to the work.”55
49. See SPINELLO& BOTTIS, supra note 46, at 5.
50. Id.
51. Margaret Chon, The Romantic Collective Author, 14 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 829, 838 (2012).
52. Lior Zemer, The Copyright Moment, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 247, 279
(2006).
53. Id.
54. CARYS J. CRAIG, COPYRIGHT, COMMUNICATION AND CULTURE:
TOWARDS A RELATIONAL THEORY OF COPYRIGHT LAW 67 (2011).
55. Chen, Collective Authorship, supra note 42, at 132.
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Supposedly, this imagined state by which creativity flourished
in times past has been adequately debunked by modern
research, as “[e]xisting literature from various disciplines has
shown that the idea of romantic authorship is a social/legal
construct and does not reflect the actual practices in the
production of cultural resources.”56 The agenda behind this
conspiratorial discourse appears to be a total obliteration of the
exclusive rights of copyright authors in favor of mass
“collaborative efforts in cultural activities” such as Wikipedia
and the Free Software Movement, the sentiment being that
“success of these projects further weakens the romantic
construction of authorship and draws attention to collaborative
efforts in cultural activities.”57
In my last article, Copyright and the Tragedy of the
Common, I critically examined several of the collectivist
copyright regimes as concocted by professors to replace current
law, specifically drawing attention to the fact that the bulk of
their claims regarding authorship are specious, unprovable,
and un-researched (at best) and largely incapable of
comprehension (at worst).58 For example, Professor Zemer has
asserted that “the public’s social contribution amounts to a de
facto contribution, and entitle[s] the public to a similar right to
that of the individual author” and that “no one is likely to deny
that copyrighted works are social entities . . . .”59 I set out to
objectively refute overreaching and untenable statements such
as this and countless others made by scholars who claim to
have proven beyond doubt that authorship is not an
independent effort, but really a collective and social
construction.60 I did this by exposing the flaws and gaps in
their predominantly theoretical and subjective credos. I also
highlighted the fact that the alternate copyright regimes
imagined by these scholars are impossible to define and codify
56. Id. at 133 (citing the works of Michel de Certeau, Jack Stillinger,
Martha Woodmansee, Peter Jaszi, and Lior Zemer); see also Mario Biagioli,
Genius Against Copyright: Revisiting Fichte’s Proof of the Illegality of
Reprinting, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1847, 1848 (2011) (maintaining that
genius is “a remarkably effective legal fiction rather than an accurate
description of the process of literary or artistic production”).
57. Chen, Collective Authorship, supra note 42, at 133.
58. Tracy Reilly, Copyright and the Tragedy of the Common, 55 IDEA 105,
153–63 (2014).
59. Zemer, supra note 52, at 279 (emphasis added).
60. Reilly, supra note 58, at 153–63.
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and, thus, enforce, let alone to justify under any rational legal
system.61 In fact, the reality of the matter is that any legal
structure which envisions that copyright is a social entity that
may somehow be owned upon creation by the public-at-large is,
in effect, not a copyright system at all; instead, it is one primed
to implement a socialist agenda that espouses the eradication
of individual property rights altogether.
I arduously chronicled the collective efforts (pun intended)
of a vast and overwhelming majority of copyright professors to
demolish the traditional notion of the creative author by
infusing collectivist principles into the concept of authorship as
defined in the Copyright Act.62 I showed that such a
metaphorical killing of the individual copyright author is not
only contrary to copyright jurisprudence as intended by the
Progress Clause, but also that it would result in works that are
less creative and more common.63 In the following pages of this
article, I will similarly demonstrate how adherence to the first
principles of both authorship and individual ownership in
copyright law will not only lead to the production of more and
better works, but it will also lead to a society of psychologically
happier people—or, a more “synergistic” society.
Interestingly, with respect to many tenets of intellectual
property law doctrine, scholars seem to regurgitate without
much question various so-called “uniform interpretation[s]” and
assumptions without bothering to fully examine whether any
underlying research actually exists to buttress their theories.64
61. See, e.g., Enninya S. Nwauche, The Emerging Right of Communal
Intellectual Property, 19 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 221, 226–27 (2015)
(supporting “the right of communities over their products and processes that
derives from their creativity and knowledge which is better described as a
peoples’ right,” yet admitting that identifying the owners, the specific content
of this right, and the limits defining the scope of this right are “difficult
questions,” which are largely unresolved by this author and others writing on
the same topic).
62. See Reilly, supra note 58, at 153–63.
63. Id. at 114 (“As such, when creativity is celebrated as being achieved,
owned, and used and reused not by individual authors but by the collective
masses, it will inevitably – and tragically – become common.”).
64. Ned Snow, The Meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause, 2013
B.Y.U. L. REV. 259, 267 (2013). For example, in examining the universally
accepted modern understanding of “science” in the Progress Clause as
“general knowledge or meaning,” Professor Ted Snow has recently
demonstrated that
this meaning admits irregularities in the hermeneutics of
constitutional interpretation, which ultimately call into question
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This can most certainly be said of the popular notion of the
death of the author, which has been accepted as “a basic tenet”
by post-modern artists and post-structuralists “who believe
that copyright law has no philosophical justification” and who
“would probably like to do without copyright
altogether.”65 Although I could go to great lengths quoting
the rampant examples of scholarly critiques of the
Romantic notion of the author, Professor Zemer has
catalogued several of these in a recent article in which he
writes with self-assured confidence that “these examples
demonstrate the fact that contemporary scholarship on
copyright recognises the wrongs inherent in Romantic
notions of authorship and the need to examine copyright
in a social context.”66 In a similar fashion, Professor Eric
Johnson assuredly proclaims that “cherished beliefs about
incentives and intellectual output can now be revealed as
myth” and that “the general case for intellectual
property rights, in so far as it is based on the idea
that external incentives are needed to encourage art and
invention, should no longer be accorded credibility in
policy debates about intellectual property law.”67
Just as Professor Snow has more critically examined the
tenet of “science” in his recent copyright article on the use
of that term in the Progress Clause,68 I will also attempt here
to comprehensively and holistically examine the meanings of
both authorship and ownership consistent with how I
believe our Framers intended those terms to serve in
determining when copyright ownership societally advances the
progress of science. Although it is today argued by many
prominent scholars of law, psychology, and literature that
individual authorship is “dead” and the traditional notion of
authorship must be somehow
the accuracy of the meaning . . . . At first glance, the uniformity of
this interpretation suggests its accuracy. If everyone has subscribed
to the same view, it must be right. But on closer examination, the
interpretation admits troubling irregularities. Taken together,
these irregularities suggest problems with the uniform
interpretation. They suggest a need for a comprehensive
examination.
Id at 265, 267.
65. Elton Fukumoto, The Author Effect After the “Death of the Author”:
Copyright in A Postmodern Age, 72 WASH. L. REV. 904–05 (1997).
66. Zemer, supra note 52, at 252 (emphasis added).
67. Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy, 39
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 623, 679 (2012).
68. See Snow, supra note 64.
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modified to include collectivist, cultural ownership, I will not
only continue to uncover the conceptual fallacies of such
axioms, but I will also explain the underlying psychological
dangers to creativity and innovation that shall ensue if such an
anti-author mentality continues to pervade our culture.
III. RESPONDING TO THE COMMUNITARIAN COPYRIGHT
CAMP
The zealous “dethronement-of-the-author” propagation
takes its form in two major lines of thought. The first, and most
common attack on the author is a byproduct of the seemingly
un-defendable hype that big business is contributing to the
demise of the public domain to the detriment of both the
individual author and the collective.69 This perpetuated and
continually re-told copyright “story,” among others, has led to
the second line of thought, which insists that any notion that a
Romantic or “genius” individual author actually creates a
copyrighted work must be eviscerated in order for copyright to
be set right and function according to its founding principles.70
In the following Sections, I will discuss these lines of thought in
great detail, debunking their veracity, and explaining the real
reason why they continue to pervade today in the bulk of
scholarly articles discussing copyright authorship.
A. THE “BIG BAD ENTERTAINMENT COMPANY”
Copyright ownership has somehow through the modern
years managed to become associated with corporate greed,
materialism, and human selfishness.71 Undeniably, a
69. TRAJCE CVETKOVSKI, COPYRIGHT AND POPULAR MEDIA: LIBERAL
VILLAINS AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 20 (2013) (“[I]ndividuals have accused
corporate owners of popular media of displaying monopolistic and greedy
tendencies.”).
70. See, e.g., Tonya M. Evans, Reverse Engineering IP, 17 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 61, 81–82 (2013) (claiming that the Romantic author concept “is
a relatively recent phenomenon and is completely at odds with the ways by
which much of literary and artistic productions are created”); Angela R. Riley,
Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to Intellectual Property in Indigenous
Communities, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, 184 (2000) (lamenting that
the law “clings tenaciously to the old ideals” of Romantic authorship and has
not been “challenged or swayed by [the] critique of the construct of
authorship”).
71. See, e.g., Charlotte Waelde, Copyright, Corporate Power and Human
Rights: Reality and Rhetoric, in 2 NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT 294 (Fiona
Macmillan ed., 2006) (“[O]ne observer” has argued that “copyright is now
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present-day theme that is commonly trickling through
copyright scholarship is the tragedy of the Maltreated Musician
who is so much of an ignoramus that he is at the mercy of the
Big Bad Entertainment Company (BBEC), which magically and
viciously winds up with ownership of his sound recordings.72 It
is quite true that the majority of sound recordings are
exclusively owned by the three remaining major record labels:
Universal Music Group, Sony BMG, and Warner Music Group73
by way of assignment clauses in artists’ recording contracts.74
Nor can it be refuted that the record industry has a rich and
well-documented history of artist exploitation, and that some
labels have unscrupulously held musicians to the terms of
unconscionable, even illegal, contracts.75
On the one hand, it is right to shed light on the illegal and
immoral practices of record labels in the early days of the
recording industry; however, this continual self-reinforcing
banter insinuating that the modern musician continues to be a
pitied fool who cannot manage an arms-length negotiation with
considered by public opinion as an illegitimate weapon in the hands of
shameless industrialists” and is a “result of both corporate and consumer
greed.”) (emphasis in original); Jane C. Ginsburg, Essay-How Copyright Got a
Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 61, 61–62 (2002) (“I have a theory
about how copyright got a bad name for itself, and I can summarize it in one
word: Greed. Corporate greed and consumer greed. Copyright owners,
generally perceived to be large, impersonal and unlovable corporations (the
human creators and interpreters—authors and performers—albeit often
initial copyright owners, tend to vanish from polemical view), have eyed
enhanced prospects for global earnings in an increasingly international
copyright market.”).
72. Martin Skladany, Alienation by Copyright: Abolishing Copyright to
Spur Individual Creativity, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 361, 363 (2008)
(claiming that “scholars have rightfully averred that our current copyright
system gives copyright holders, especially corporations, too much influence in
shaping and limiting our political participation, economy, culture, beliefs, and
desires”).
73. There were six major record labels in the 1990s, but after several
mergers, today there remain only three. See Zack O’Malley Greenburg,
Revenge of the Record Labels: How the Majors Renewed Their Grip on Music,
FORBES (April 15, 2015, 10:01 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/zackomalley
greenburg/2015/04/15/revenge-of-the-record-labels-how-the-majors-renewed-
their-grip-on-music/.
74. W. Jonathan Cardi, Über-Middleman: Reshaping the Broken
Landscape of Music Copyright, 92 IOWA L. REV. 835, 848 (2007).
75. See, e.g., Phillip W. Hall, Jr., Smells Like Slavery: Unconscionability
in Recording Industry Contracts, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 189, 190
(2002) (noting that usage of standard recording contracts “has forced artists
into a position that some have said amounts to professional slavery”).
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the record industry is not only insulting, but has also steadily
escalated into a dangerous rhetoric recited ad nauseam by
scholars in order to justify a loosening of copyright protection in
all entertainment industries since most authors do not “control
and profit from their own work” anyway.76 It also fails to
recognize the fact that, by and large, musicians who sign with
major labels receive major benefits which they could not
otherwise achieve on their own, including advances, usage of
studio time, expert producers and music engineers, tour
support, etc., and that entertainment companies take on huge
business risks and devote many resources and investment in
order to ensure that content produced by artists is distributed
to the public.77 Alas, within all the scholarly articles that
constantly parade the faults of the record labels in support of
the BBEC talking point, one is hard pressed to find discussion
of the fact that many labels pair novice artists with experienced
professionals who help them find audiences, reinvent
themselves, and otherwise “serve as creative partners”
throughout a lucrative career.78
Although this BBEC theme appears frequently in
copyright scholarship stories, perhaps one of the most
egregious examples is from Professor Joanna Demers in her
book, Steal This Music.79 In Chapter One, Professor Demers
mentions an ad campaign recently launched by the Motion
Picture Association of America (MPAA) to counteract the
bootlegging and piracy of movies, particularly the production of
a public service announcement aired prior to the start of films
in most American movie theaters in which stuntmen and other
“presumably working-class individual[s]” in the movie industry
profess that the downloading of a movie is compared to stealing
76. JOANNA DEMERS, STEAL THIS MUSIC: HOW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW AFFECTSMUSICAL CREATIVITY 12 (2006).
77. See Helienne Lindvall, Behind the Music: What do Record Labels
Actually Do? You’d be Surprised, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 2, 2012), https://www
.theguardian.com/music/musicblog/2012/feb/02/behind-music-record-labels
(speaking to musician Ed Sheeran who explains how signing with a major
record label allowed him to pay his living expenses while still writing music
full time). See generally Saul Hansel, Bits Debate: Is Copy Protection Needed
or Futile?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2008, 4:18 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com
/2008/01/14/bits-debate-is-copy-protection-needed-or-futile.
78. ROBERT LEVINE, FREE RIDE: HOW DIGITAL PARASITES ARE
DESTROYING THE CULTURE BUSINESS, AND HOW THE CULTURE BUSINESS CAN
FIGHT BACK 50 (2011).
79. See generally DEMERS, supra note 76.
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a candy bar.80 Professor Demers discusses how the strategy of
the campaign “appeals to our sense of fairness” and maintains
that
[w]hat this commercial doesn’t tell us, however, is that the
copyrights to films are owned not by the stuntmen, or by actors, or
even by directors or screenwriters. Instead, film production
companies own them and distribute royalties among the various
individuals involved in a movie’s creation. The MPAA did not
undertake this campaign merely to protect the grips or stuntmen
who earn a day-to-day living working on films. Production
companies are panicking at revenue losses that threaten the salaries
of CEOs who often do not participate at all in the creative process of
making movies. The Respect Copyrights campaign is a recent
example of a centuries-old strategy on the part of publishers to cast
copyright as a moral right. According to their stance, copyright
promotes creativity by ensuring that authors can control and profit
from their own work. As we’ll see below, this argument brushes
aside the fact that most authors do not own the copyrights to their
work; they sell them to a publisher or record label in exchange for a
share in the royalties and a guarantee that their work will be
distributed commercially . . . . The true beneficiaries of recent
[intellectual property] law changes are neither authors nor
consumers, but rather corporate content providers.81
If we dissect this paragraph, it fails to make sense on
several levels. On the most basic level, it ignores the obvious
fact that the act of selling a copyright to a publisher or label is
the very essence of exclusive control that every Copyright Act
enacted in this country affords to authors, as mandated by the
United States Constitution.82 Under the Copyright Act, an
author automatically secures a copyright in a creation if it is an
original work of authorship that is fixed in a tangible medium
of expression.83 Once so secured, the author alone is provided
80. Id. at 11.
81. Id. at 11–12 (emphasis in original). For a similar discussion of the
MPAA’s ad campaign, see LEWIS HYDE, COMMON AS AIR: REVOLUTION, ART
AND OWNERSHIP 4–9 (2012).
82. Congress has the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries[.]” U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (emphasis added). Congress first codified exclusive rights to
authors of works in the Copyright Act of 1790. See DONALD S. CHISUM &
MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 4B, at 4-7–
4-9 (1992). The Copyright Act of 1976, as amended, is the current law
protecting the exclusive rights of original works to their authors. See 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101–1332 (2012).
83. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). A work “is fixed in a tangible medium of
expression” when its “embodiment in a copy or phonorecord . . . is sufficiently
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with various exclusive rights to that work that may (but need
not) be exercised: the right to reproduce; the right to make
derivative works; the right to distribute; the right to perform;
and the right to transmit.84 Moreover, whereas copyright
rights—like rights in real property—are fully assignable and
licensable, the Copyright Act does not affirmatively require the
copyright owner to give or license away their works.85
Professor Demers, however, insinuates that recent changes
to intellectual property laws somehow place the authors of
creative works in a copyright caboose while handing the engine
keys to corporations whose profits line only the CEOs’ pockets.
To the contrary, this notion is actually refuted by Professor
Demers herself when she acknowledges in the very same
sentence that authors do, in fact, sell their rights to companies
in exchange for royalties and a guarantee of distribution!
Nobody puts a gun to the copyright owner’s head and forces
him to give up his copyright. At the end of the day, it is a choice
made by the author, and the author alone. Sometimes the
choice is a bad one, while frequently, it is a good one. Either
way, the decision to assign copyright rights to a business entity
is solely initially in the hands of each individual author.
Professor Demers’ outburst claiming that the CEOs of the
BBECs are only concerned with their own salaries is a juvenile
attempt to divert attention from the corporate structural
workings of the entertainment industry. Yes, it is true that
CEOs who ultimately control large amounts of capital fund
movie making—otherwise, the world would not be blessed with
iconic and creatively inspirational works such as Star Wars,
Jaws, and other high-production movies of value. But these
BBECs also employ thousands of other folks besides the
authors who are creating the original content, including the
“working class” people whom Professor Demers pretends to
extend sympathy.86 Demers conveniently fails to play out the
story she weaves to the final scene: as the BBEC folds up shop
and the stuntmen, grips, make-up artists and all other
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” H.R. REP. NO.
94-1476, at 53 (1976) (internal quotations omitted).
84. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
85. Susan J. Latham, Newton v. Diamond: Measuring the Legitimacy of
Unauthorized Compositional Sampling—A Clue Illuminated and Obscured, 26
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 119, 125 (2003).
86. MERGES, supra note 12, at 221.
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employees of the BBEC, are suddenly out of work. Moreover, as
Professor Merges profoundly notes, if we dismantle the BBECs,
“it will surely affect small and independent creators as well.”87
Viewing the workings of the music industry with a derisive
and myopic lens, most copyright law critics fail to ever
recognize—even cursorily—that “[r]ecord labels undertake
significant risk in signing artists and must recoup their
expenses and earn a profit on the commercial success of a few”
and that “labels then use such profits to invest in the next
generation of artists.”88 Additionally, “[i]n cases where the
artist never achieves commercial success—as is the case with
the majority of new artists—the label does not require the
artist to repay its investment.”89 Copyright practitioner Brian
Day estimates that
[s]pecifically, record labels provide a typical new artist with over
$1,000,000 in capital to promote a new album, while providing more
established artists with nearly $5,000,000 in total funding. New
artists generally receive a $200,000 advance for personal expenses,
which allows the artists to concentrate on their creative work, and
an additional $200,000 for recording costs. On average, the label
pays another $300,000 for artist promotion and marketing, $200,000
for music videos, and $100,000 to fund the artist’s first promotional
tour.90
Another author has noted that “[t]he music business is the
only one where such giant corporations risk billions of dollars
on untested musical acts, only 5% of which ultimately turn a
profit.”91
Professor Demers’ pitch against the MPAA also neglects to
mention that self-publishers cannot achieve nearly as much of
an audience as traditional publishers do in distribution and
dissemination of works. It is vogue to feign concern for authors
who were raped of their copyrights (so the great story is told,
and retold), but the flipside of the situation—when authors
87. Id. at 222.
88. Brian Day, In Defense of Copyright: Record Labels, Creativity, and the
Future of Music, 21 SETONHALL J. SPORTS& ENT. L. 61, 75 (2011).
89. Id.
90. Id. (citing DONALD PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE
MUSIC BUSINESS 61–118 (7th ed. 2009), which provides a comprehensive and
detailed overview of the many facets of the business model of the record
company).
91. Connie Chang, Can’t Record Labels and Recording Artists All Just Get
Along?: The Debate over California Labor Code S 2855 and Its Impact on the
Music Industry, 12 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART& ENT. L. 13, 15 (2002).
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hold onto their ownership rights at the expense of actually
getting their product distributed to the folks—is usually not the
best solution for the advancement of the author’s career, or the
progress of society as a whole, for that matter.92
Professor Demers is certainly not the only copyright
scholar to begrudge the success of the BBECs.93 Professor Mark
Lemley believes laws regarding the ownership of copyrighted
works “are heavily skewed to protect the interests of
corporations, not individual authors . . . .”94 To buttress his
opinion, Professor Lemley cites the work-made-for-hire
doctrine95 and the doctrines of assignment and transfer of
copyright rights96 as examples of how copyrights “end up not in
the hands of authors . . . but in the hands of corporate economic
interests.”97 Like Professor Demers, however, Professor Lemley
conveniently fails to note that original copyright authors
receive significant and meaningful benefits from BBECs when
they choose to assign rights to their creative works.98
The professorial escalation of the BBEC myth is dangerous
because it contributes to public opinion—particularly among
the younger generation and the students of these professors—
that non-sanctioned acts like piracy and unauthorized
downloading should not be illegal since the record companies
make enough of a profit and are not harmed by such acts,
92. Max Dunbar, The Great Underground Myth: Why Self-Publishing
Doesn’t Work, 3:AM MAGAZINE (Nov. 29, 2009), http://www.3ammagazine.com
/3am/the-great-underground-myth-why-self-publishing-doesnt-work/.
93. See, e.g., Note, Not in Court ‘Cause I Stole A Beat: The Digital Music
Sampling Debate’s Discourse on Race and Culture, and the Need for Test Case
Litigation, 2012 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 141, 158 (2012) (“While the RIAA
claims that illegal mixtape regulation takes money from rich musical pirates
and compensates artists, the rights to original work are often held by
corporations rather than the artists themselves. The truth is that digital
sampling enables black artists, both DJs and otherwise, to produce their own
cultural and economic capital in the face of a monopolistic music industry.”).
94. Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property,
75 TEX. L. REV. 873, 882 (1997) (reviewing JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS,
SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY (1996)).
95. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012).
96. Id. § 201(d).
97. Lemley, supra note 94, at 883.
98. See LEVINE, supra note 78, at 50 (“[A]lthough some artists regret
signing with labels, the choice is theirs . . . .”).
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anyway.99 Scholars such as Professor Lessig are authors of
best-selling books (which, ironically, are protected by the
imprimatur of the 1976 Act, and not available for reuse on
Creative Commons) that vastly undermine the loss of revenue
that the record companies have experienced since Napster and
other popular file-sharing websites have arrived on the online
scene. Although the music industry today is gaining $7.9 billion
less in annual retail sales than it was a decade and a half
ago,100 Lessig consistently maintains that it is “hard to reckon”
just how harmful file sharing has been to the industry.101
Such an anti-corporate stance also sadly perpetuates the
notion of the scorned and abused recording artist who should
be pitied and whom lawmakers should somehow assist by
legislating amendments to contract and copyright law and
other codes which purportedly even the playing field for artists
who would be otherwise forced to sign a contract which is really
nothing more than an “indentured servitude.”102 Instead of the
desire to encourage artists to become more educated about the
business in which they are engaged—or to hire someone who
is—we instead as a society continue to repeat the self-serving
clap-trap of the oppressed artist/victim who needs a legal
handout or a new law in order to succeed at his craft.103 Such a
99. Victoria R. McDonald, Stirring the Waters: Whether the Pirate Bay
Case and the Thomas-Rasset Case Will Impact File Sharing and Piracy in
Sweden and the United States, 20 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 563, 590
(2011). The author states that
many people feel that file sharing should not be illegal, as
copyright laws are outdated with respect to new file sharing
technology and there is a perceived lack of harm to the already
profitable music industry. Some analysts say ‘[t]here is a Robin
Hood effect’ in which ‘[m]ost people perceive celebrities and studios
to be rich already and as a result don’t think of movie downloading
as a big deal.’
Id.; see also Poll: Americans Think Downloading No Big Deal, MSNBC (Jan.
26, 2007, 4:26 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16828408/.
100. See Greenburg, supra note 73.
101. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL
CREATIVITY 69 (2004).
102. Chang, supra note 91, at 13 (internal quotations omitted).
103. The existing laws are, in fact, all artists need. The Copyright Act
contains sufficient protection. One example is 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2012), which
provides that authors have the right to terminate transfers and reclaim
ownership of their works of authorship during a five-year window of time
starting on the thirty-fifth anniversary of the execution of any license or
conveyance. It may be unfortunate that as of mid-2015, fewer than 300
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victim mentality is fostered by law professors who continue to
beat the BBEC drum, and is extremely dangerous because once
one adopts this policy, one “will never be able to escape
poverty” and mental attitudes will progressively shift to search
for the perpetrator who caused such collective suffering,
whether it be evil corporations or the government, and
if the number of people who believed this kind of doctrine were to
increase, all positive activity in the world would cease, and jealousy
would be justified. This doctrine would lead people to rationalize
their feelings of envy and develop ideas about how to bring down
those who are successful, accusing them of achieveing their goals
through wrongdoing. However, it is quite obvious that anyone who
thinks in this way can never be successful.104
Thanks in large part to the collectivist copyright movement
proliferated by the professors discussed above and countless
others, people today do not like big companies, they do not like
the recording industry; however, they most certainly like “the
idea that they can get something for free.”105 But, as one author
aptly noted, to reinterpret the public interest as a personal
interest of individuals to receive copyrighted works without
paying for them “is as much a perversion of the Constitutional
copyright clause as is the anthropomorphically nonsensical, but
infinitely self-serving, adage ‘Information wants to be free.’”106
Indeed, as my father had instructed me throughout
childhood that “there is no such thing as a free lunch,” in the
following Sections of this article, I will show that collective
copyright rights effectively beget no copyright rights which, in
turn, will obviously result in the generation of less creative
works.107 I will return to the theme of the Big Bad
authors (of all disciplines, be they songwriters, book authors, recording artists,
etc.) have recorded recapture termination notices, and that their reasons for
having not done so range from ignorance of the law to procrastination to
intentional delay for strategic advantage. That does not mean, though, that
there is not an existing law that is sufficient to protect their rights. See, e.g.,
Joe Bogdan, The Little Law that Could (and Probably Will): Section 203
Copyright Recapture Terminations in America, AM. J. ARTS MGMT. (Nov.
2015), at 1–3, 5.
104. RYUHO OKAWA, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PROGRESS: HIGHER THINKING
FOR DEVELOPING INFINITE PROSPERITY 6–7 (2005).
105. LEVINE, supra note 78, at 61–62 (quoting Texas economics Professor
Stan Liebowitz).
106. Ginsburg, supra note 71, at 62.
107. See, e.g., SPINELLO & BOTTIS, supra note 46, at 5 (maintaining that
when the premise of individual autonomy is denied by academicians, “legal
regimes dedicated to preserving autonomy are destabilized”).
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Entertainment Company in order to reestablish the founding
notion that individual copyright rights lead to the creation and
dissemination of more creative works, and I will demonstrate
why and how applying the creed of ethical individualism to
copyright jurisprudence ultimately assures a more productive,
more educated, more creative, more original, and more happy
society.
B. GENIUSHAS BECOME A FOUR-LETTERWORD
Another unintended (or, perhaps, intended?) consequence
of the anti-author rhetoric is that the moniker of “genius” when
ascribed to an author, creator, or innovator who has achieved
an extraordinarily original or useful work of intellectual
property has truly become a four-letter word in today’s
academic community.108 Before it became vogue in the ivory
towers of law schools, the anti-author movement was initiated
largely by French literary theorists in the twentieth century
such as Roland Barthes, who challenged the “expressive
theory” of the author in which the creator of a work was
thought to pronounce his inner passions, humors, feelings, and
impressions which make up his essence and sense of self, by
famously claiming the “death of the author.”109 According to
Barthes, no longer should we speak of authors (and most
certainly not of geniuses) but we must talk instead about a
“functionary called the writer or scriptor” who originates
nothing and who merely “imitates a gesture that is always
anterior” and simply “translates a ready-formed dictionary.”110
In this spirit of the death of the author, Barthes sought to
alter the image of literature that he believed was “tyrannically
centered” on the author’s life and passions, which represent
“the epitome and culmination of capitalist ideology, which has
attached the greatest importance to the ‘person’ of the
108. Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in
Intellectual Property, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81, 83 (1998) (describing
recent efforts to redefine personhood interests of intangible creations “into
paradigms called, sometimes derisively, the ‘Romantic genius’ and the
‘inventor-hero’”).
109. Andrew Bennett, Expressivity: The Romantic Theory of Authorship, in
LITERARY THEORY AND CRITICISM: AN OXFORD GUIDE 48 (Patricia Waugh ed.,
2006) (quoting Roland Barthes, The Death of the Author, in AUTHORSHIP:
FROM PLATO TO THE POSTMODERN: A READER 128 (Sean Burke ed., 1995)).
110. Id.
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author.”111 As such, in Barthes’ scheme the “modern scriptor”
would be a writer who authored texts as opposed to the
outdated notion that he was an author who produced books.112
The true hero according to Barthes is not the author, the
writer, or even the modern scriptor: it is the reader who has a
“constitutive role” in authorship and is “the true and only
source of the otherwise mythical unity of the text.”113 Thus, the
figure of the author has “turned from a ‘who’ into a ‘what’.”114
Barthes, overjoyed that we no longer have to “bend our ear to
the supposedly personal voice of the named, individual author,”
maintains instead that “we should attend to the anonymous
murmuring of the collective discours[e].”115
Another infamous literary theorist, Michel Foucault,
echoes Barthes’ thoughts on Romantic authorship by declaring
that “since the eighteenth century, the author has played the
role of the regulator of the fictive, a role quite characteristic of
our era of industrial and bourgeois society, of individualism
and private property.”116 Like Barthes, Foucault’s mission was
to obliterate the personal being and the individuality of the
author-figure: in other words, to rape him of his very identity
vis a vis his readership.117
The influence of this French circle of postmodern literary
theorists, which includes Barthes, Foucault, and others, has
been so pervasive that in the wake of their writings “authorial
disappearance has been accepted by structuralist and
poststructuralists critics almost as an article of faith.”118
Indeed, one contemporary literacy author who is the progeny of
the French circle of deconstructionists has gone so far as to
submit that the construct of the uber-heroic individual author
111. ROLAND BARTHES & STEPHEN HEATH, IMAGE, MUSIC, TEXT 143
(1978).
112. Adrian Wilson, Foucault on the “Question of the Author”: A Critical
Exegesis, 99 MOD. LANGUAGE REV. 339, 341 (2004) (internal quotations
omitted).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 342.
115. Id.
116. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE FOUCAULT READER 119 (1984).
117. Wilson, supra note 112, at 359.
118. SEÁN BURKE, THE DEATH AND RETURN OF THE AUTHOR: CRITICISM
AND SUBJECTIVITY IN BARTHES, FOUCAULT AND DERRIDA 17 (1998).
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may not have ever even existed in the first place.119 These
invidious (and largely incoherent)120 writer-as-anonymous-
creator literary approaches serve to further the contemporary
objective to welcome and hail a collectivist society in the wake
of the final and dastardly destruction of the individual.
Enter stage the copyright academicians who have
lecherously leaped upon such obscene premises and used them
as a platform upon which to justify attack of the legal standard
of authorship. I fully understand and share the contemporary
frustration that copyright ownership has become too lengthy
and as a result it impinges upon the public domain for far from
limited times; however, the underlying message that these
professors are animating has a much deeper and decidedly
more philosophically dangerous interpretation if one reads
between the lines. For example, Professor Alan Durham has
stated that
the un-romantic, text-centered model seems more in tune with the
social benefits rationale said to be at the heart of copyright. The
satisfaction of public needs—including the need to “promote the
progress” of knowledge—depends upon the content of the works
available to the public. It does not depend, directly, on the
circumstances of their creation. Whether a work took great effort or
no effort to produce, whether it is personal or impersonal, whether it
is the product of genius or incompetence is of little consequence to
the consuming public, however important it might be to the author.
Genius, personality, and effort may produce superior works, but it is
the product that is important to society.121
Does the professor really not understand that his claim
that the circumstances under which great works are created
are meaningless leads to an inevitable conclusion that he is
advocating what will ultimately serve to be the social demise of
any great work? Personally, I do not wish to live in this myopic
“un-romantic” dystopia that is urged by Professor Durham and
his cohorts. I choose to continue to honor creative endeavors
and recognize them for what they truly are: works of genius.
Steven Pressfield has beautifully spoken of tapping into the
creative “muse” in all of us:
When we conceive an enterprise and commit to it in the face of our
fears, something wonderful happens. A crack appears in the
119. JONATHAN ALEXANDER, DIGITAL YOUTH: EMERGING LITERACIES ON
THEWORLDWIDEWEB 43 (2006).
120. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 112, at 359.
121. Alan L. Durham, The Random Muse: Authorship and Determinacy, 44
WM. & MARY L. REV. 569, 617–18 (2002).
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membrane. Like the first craze when a chick pecks at the inside of
its shell. Angel midwives congregate around us; they assist as we
give birth to ourselves, to that person we are born to be, to the one
whose destiny was encoded in our soul, our daimon, our genius.122
The meaning of genius was a cultural form born out of the
Enlightenment period in Europe as it witnessed the rapid
growth of progress and innovation by non-secular persons of all
walks of life, which had previously been reserved to priests and
rulers who had the power to control and restrict innovation to
select sources, usually in the form of revelations from God.123
As such, it is important to point out to the young law students
(and perhaps one or two others who may actually read this
piece) that genius did not always confer the type of social
negativity then as it does today; in fact, it was quite the
opposite.124 As the century of progress ensued, society became
gifted with more creative and innovative works, and the “myth
of genius was the vehicle for the public to recognize and reward
the genius with adulation.”125 Scottish Enlightenment thinkers
went so far as believing that literary geniuses had an
affirmative responsibility to imbue society with morality and
improvement by “apply[ing] their artistic talent to the needs of
contemporary readers.”126
The tide began to turn as nineteenth century philosophers
such as Jeremy Bentham and Karl Marx launched attacks
against individualistic morals, claiming that rights to property
and the ability to enjoy and dispose of one’s possessions as one
sees fit is an egoistic and selfish attribute that leads to a
separation of man from the larger community.127 This
movement eventually led to the post-structuralism claims
made by Barthes, Foucault, and other progressives, that the
independent, “atomistic” individual is merely a fictional
122. STEVEN PRESSFIELD, THE WAR OF ART: BREAK THROUGH THE BLOCKS
ANDWIN YOUR INNER CREATIVE BATTLES 123 (2002) (emphasis in original).
123. CARL PLETSCH, YOUNG NIETZSCHE: BECOMING A GENIUS 212 (1992)
(describing the stereotypical view of the genius in the nineteenth century).
124. DARRIN MCMAHON, DIVINE FURY: A HISTORY OF GENIUS xvii (2013)
(“Scholars have long recognized the genius’s emergence in this period as the
highest human type, a new paragon of human excellence who was the focus of
extensive contemporary comment and observation.”).
125. PLETSCH, supra note 123, at 212.
126. COREY E. ANDREWS, THE GENIUS OF SCOTLAND: THE CULTURAL
PRODUCTION OF ROBERT BURNS, 1785–1834, at 56 (2015).
127. See TARA SMITH, MORAL RIGHTS AND POLITICAL FREEDOM 61 (1995).
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construct which never really has existed in the first place.128
Indeed, today we are witnessing a continued attack against
individualism in the areas of literary criticism, law, and even
politics, as our prominent national leaders make claims such as
“you didn’t build that!” when proclaiming that government
assistance, not individual effort, leads to the creation of a
successful business.129
Moreover, the hortatory purgation of the author that is
urged by the progressive French writers—much like the
contemporary push for the death of copyright discussed in
Section II.A—is unreflectively accepted in literary and other
circles as proven truth, despite the fact that many
commentators innately perceive that the theory is somehow
eschewed and, perhaps, downright “wrong.”130 Despite the
repeated academic attempts to give birth to some imaginary
collective author/owner and eschew the concept of individual
authorship and intellect,
the fact remains that the individual, not the community, has a mind;
the individual, not the group, does the thinking; the individual, not
society, produces knowledge; and the individual, not society, shares
that knowledge with others who, in turn, must use their individual
minds if they are to grasp it. Any individual who chooses to observe
the facts of reality can see that this is so. The fact that certain
“philosophers” (or “dialogic communities”) deny it has no bearing on
the truth of the matter.131
As philosopher David Hume had warned, “[t]he richest
genius, like the most fertile soil, when left uncultivated, shoots
up into the rankest weeds.”132 More recently, a few lone
academicians such as Professor Harold Bloom have noted that,
regardless of the fact that contemporary scholars (or, as he
terms them, “cultural levelers quite immune from awe”) have
done their best to obliterate the notion of genius, it is a concept
128. See id.
129. See Aaron Blake, Obama’s ‘You Didn’t Build That’ Problem, WASH.
POST (July 18, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post
/obamas-you-didnt-build-that-problem/2012/07/18/gJQAJxyotW_blog.html.
130. John M. Burke, The Death and Return of the Author: Criticism and
Subjectivity in Barthes, Foucault and Derrida 12–13, (1989) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Edinburgh), https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk
/handle/1842/7375.
131. Craig Biddle, Individualism vs. Collectivism: Our Future, Our Choice,
OBJECTIVE STANDARD, https://www.theobjectivestandard.com/issues/2012-
spring/individualism-collectivism/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2017).
132. ANDREWS, supra note 126, at 51 (quoting David Hume, The Stoic
(1742), http://www.econlib.org/library/LFBooks/Hume/hmMPL16.html).
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that is needed by humanity, “however envious or uncomfortable
it makes many among us.”133 Contrary, then, to the egalitarian,
collectivist callings from Barthes and Foucault in the literary
realm to Lemley and Lessig in copyright law circles, it is not
the notion of copyright author that must be eviscerated, but the
progressive, collective envy of the copyright author.
C. COPYRIGHT ENVY
When reflecting upon the intentions of many in society
who would prefer to banish the historical notions of copyright
authorship and originality, it appears that the only rational
motivation for this change is a designed intent to abolish the
privileges and benefits that accrue to those who create—
especially those who create works that are considered
“genius.”134 Even more problematic, the continued universal
degradation of the Romantic author and modern innovator can
only be understood by looking through a pessimistic, nihilist,
and primitive lens, which shuns the very greatest of man’s
modern achievements.135 While scholars claim that the anti-
author trope is necessary to dispel the continued diminishment
of the public domain,136 I submit that this reason is smoke-and-
mirrors for the true motivation behind the call for the death of
the Romantic author: copyright envy.
The definition of envy has its roots in the Latin words “in”
(upon) and “videre” (“to see”) and means “to look maliciously
upon; to feel displeasure and ill-will at the superiority of
133. HAROLD BLOOM, GENIUS: A MOSAIC OF ONE HUNDRED EXEMPLARY
CREATIVE MINDS 7 (2002). Interestingly, Professor Bloom believes that the
death-of-the-author trope witnessed in the last century has “become rubbish,”
and that the “dead genius is more alive than we are.” Id. at 4.
134. Chris Dodd, Copyright: Empowering Innovation and Creativity,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 10, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chris-dodd
/copyright-empowering-inno_b_3417472.html (“[T]he founders of our republic
considered copyright so important to unlocking the creative and economic
potential of this country that they explicitly called for its protection and
promotion in our Constitution.”).
135. See Alan Pratt, Nihilism, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://www
.iep.utm.edu/nihilism/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2017).
136. Peter Jaszi, Toward A Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of
“Authorship”, 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 501–02 (1991) (“[T]he overall incoherence
of the law’s account of ‘authorship’ may be best understood as reflecting a
continuing struggle between the economic forces that (at least in the abstract)
would be best served by the further depersonalization of creative endeavor
and the ideological persistence of an increasingly inefficient version of
individualism.”).
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(another person) in happiness, success, reputation, or the
possession of anything desirable; to regard with discontent
another’s possessions or advantages.”137 Sadly, it has been well-
documented by modern philosophers such as David Norton that
“the common response to one man’s advantage is resentment
and envy by others.”138 When such feelings of individual envy
are left unchecked and misunderstood, entire groups form in
order to rationalize the collective evisceration of those excellent
persons or beneficial situations which reflect the opposite traits
in the group of those who are envious.139
Kierkegaard believed that envy reigns in a society when a
large majority of its members come together on the basis of
what they are against rather than what they are for; and what
they are against is “a person’s being different” from, or better
than, the masses.140 This collective societal reaction to a
perceived, chronic state of inequality in which some members
rise in excellence over the herd of others eventually leads to a
“moral ressentiment,” or a “displaced, vengeful hostility,” in
which “the suffering person ultimately lashes out at a
convenient target in an effort to ‘level’ enduring differences
between the self and others enjoying advantages.”141 Instead of
taking measures to cultivate the traits or obtain the things that
one is envious of in others,
the end point of the strong desiring of something (i.e., something
envied) might lead to its opposite, a kind of ‘sour grapes’ writ large.
Ressentiment can be seen as an extreme end state, almost
dispositional, in which reactions to protracted feelings of inferiority
and envy produces a toxic, embittered state of mind. This process,
presumably, can operate at the individual and group levels.142
Indeed, not even Kierkegaard himself could have imagined
how true his predictions would be. In the age of the acceptance
and glorification of all things internet-related, our society has
mostly failed to acknowledge that the internet is filled with
137. LYNN S. MESKILL, BEN JONSON AND ENVY 17 (2009) (emphasis
omitted) (internal citations omitted).
138. DAVID L. NORTON, PERSONAL DESTINIES: A PHILOSOPHY OF ETHICAL
INDIVIDUALISM 10 (1976).
139. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B BARNETT, KIERKEGAARD, PIETISM AND
HOLINESS 151 (2013).
140. Id.
141. Zlatan Križan & Richard H. Smith, When Comparisons Divide:
Invidious Emotions and Their Social Control, in COMMUNAL FUNCTIONS OF
SOCIAL COMPARISON 74 (Zlatan Križan & Frederick X. Gibbons eds., 2014).
142. Id. at 75 (emphasis in original).
2017] COPYRIGHT AND A SYNERGISTIC SOCIETY 607
angry people making angry and resentful statements, and
blaming whatever they may be angry about at any given
moment on somebody else.143
Rampant envy-based ressentiment has a natural
consequence; a phenomenon that Kierkegaard termed
“leveling,” or “abstraction’s victory over individuals,” which he
likens to a “deathly stillness in which nothing can rise up, but
everything sinks down into it, impotent.”144 During the leveling
process, all persons are equalized and “no one is better than
anyone else.”145 In other words, a leveling society is one that
neither finds, nor seeks, heroes; one that justifies the
obliteration of any semblance of the genius, the passionate and
individual soul. In short, it is one in which the common in all is
both revered and despised, at the same time.
According to Professor Howard Tuttle, Kierkegaard
thought that even back in the nineteenth century during which
he lived and wrote consisted of a loss of passion in which the
age of heroic action was no longer expected.146 Because of this
lack of moral character, “the individual denigrates and even
ridicules those who have distinguished themselves. It is not
enough to admire and envy the other: one must tear him down.
To be effective, leveling must be done in concert with others; it
is essentially a collective phenomenon.”147 Ayn Rand further
describes this peculiarly upended tendency of prevalent societal
envy as “an emotional mechanism set in reverse: a response of
hatred, not toward human vices, but toward human virtues,” in
which there persists a “hatred of the good for being the
143. Jon Henley, The Great Internet Swindle: Ever Get the Feeling You’ve
Been Swindled?, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com
/technology/2015/feb/09/andrew-keen-internet-not-answer-interview.
144. BARNETT, supra note 139, at 151 (quoting Soren Kierkegaard)
(citation omitted).
145. RICHARD STIVERS SHADES OF LONELINESS: PATHOLOGIES OF A
TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY 15 (2004).
146. See, e.g., HOWARD NELSON TUTTLE, THE CROWD IS UNTRUTH: THE
EXISTENTIAL CRITIQUE OF MASS SOCIETY IN THE THOUGHT OF KIERKEGAARD,
NIETZSCHE, HEIDEGGER, AND ORTEGA Y GASSET 29 (1996) (“Any recognition of
an actual hero or leader seems based on envy, not admiration. Heroic motives
are assigned to everyone and no one; leadership seems to belong to everyone
and no one; leaders seem to lack authority; and even political passion seems to
be exhausted.”).
147. STIVERS, supra note 145, at 15.
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good.”148 In her poignant and, often chillingly prophetic piece
penned in the 1960s entitled “The Age of Envy,” Ayn Rand
described what she perceived as the prevalent modern societal
attitude in which, oddly, there exists a hatred of the values
that individuals regard as good by their own judgment or, more
specifically, “hatred of a person for possessing a value or virtue
one regards as desirable.”149
And, lo and behold, as I pen these words in the summer of
2016, I stop to read a news article claiming that Yale
undergraduate English majors have petitioned the department
to ban a year-long introductory course on the subject because
they “don’t want to study the greatest English writers” since
reading about the works of dead white men “creates a culture
that is especially hostile to students of color.”150 The petition
requests “that Major English Poets be abolished, and that the
pre-1800/1900 requirements be refocused to deliberately
include literatures relating to gender, race, sexuality, ableism,
and ethnicity.”151 If I were to attempt to concoct a news story
that best exemplified the type of hatred-of-the-good-for-being-
good described decades ago by Rand, it could not be more
manifest than this. Sadly, however, the article—and the envy
and hatred that emanates from the students who have been so
completely enculturated by the fear-mongering antics of their
professors—is altogether too real, and too true. At least one
journalist has seen through the veneer of Professor Lessig’s
supposed campaign to champion the rights of authors by
recognizing that his philosophy, when unpeeled from its “ill-
defined cultural eden” and studied rationally is, in reality, the
most manifest type of author-envy:
I believe that [Lessig] presents himself as friend of artists when he is
actually a bitter, bitter foe . . . . He telegraphs his contempt towards
those that create art in virtually all his essays and books. It often
seems personal. Maybe it’s like the Saturday Night Live skit that
“explains” Albert Goldman’s hatred of John Lennon. In the skit
Goldman was The Beatles trombone player until Lennon fired him.
148. Ayn Rand, The Age of Envy, in THE AYN RAND READER 115 (Gary Hull
& Leonard Peikoff eds., 1999).
149. Id.
150. Bradford Richardson, Yale Students: Studying White, Male Writers
Creates Culture ‘Hostile to Students of Color,’ WASH. TIMES (June 2, 2016),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jun/2/yale-students-white-male-
writers-hostile-culture/.
151. Notable & Quotable: A Yale Petition, WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/notable-quotable-a-yale-petition-1464992359.
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Was Lessig kicked out of a [band]? Did “hollywood” kick his ass in a
couple court fights? Is that what all this is about?152
Although envy may be a natural tendency in man,
particularly in his primitive stages, “it has become clear that
countries built on a philosophy that rationalizes envy have all
become weak and poor.”153 Indeed, if we are so fragile of a
culture that we cannot bring ourselves to appreciate and—
heaven forbid, enjoy and learn from—the canonical works of
great Western literature merely due to an irrational fear that
they are written by white men, there is not a chance in Haedes
for any kind of individual or collective human success. When
our students who hail from the best universities in the country
are themselves demanding, not just diversification in the
curriculum, but an outright abolishment of the canons in the
spirit of “decolonization”—or basically rewriting history to quell
the anxiety felt by the mass man for being common—our
culture is on the brink of witnessing both the personal and
social havoc that ensues when envy is not overthrown by
greatness. When we fail to globally and intentionally emulate
genius, as Professor Bloom describes, by deliberately invoking
“the transcendental and the extraordinary” in ourselves,154 that
is when the purpose of the Progress Clause will have been
entirely obfuscated.
To combat the tendencies of envy and other primeval traits
that exist in non-civilized humanity, a community must
develop a set of values that are established in order to nurture
successful relationships among human beings.155 Without
doubt, then, Waterman’s ideal synergistic society can certainly
not be achieved in copyright law realms if the continued attack
on the Romantic author pervades, leading to its necessary end
evincing a weakened and standard-less system of ownership, as
will be discussed further in the following Sections of this
article.
152. David C. Lowery, The Bad Science and Greed Behind the “Intellectual
Property Inhibiting Innovation” Argument. Part 4, THE TRICHORDIST (June 22,
2012), https://thetrichordist.com/2012/06/22/the-bad-science-and-greed-behind-
the-intellectual-property-inhibiting-innovation-argument-part-4/.
153. OKAWA, supra note 104, at 7.
154. BLOOM, supra note 133, at 12.
155. RAND, supra note 148, at 118–19.
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IV. ETHICAL INDIVIDUALISM AND COPYRIGHT LAW:
THE MODEL FOR A SYNERGISTIC SOCIETY
According to Waterman, the philosophy of normative, or
ethical individualism is a framework for personal behavior and
social interaction, as well as a theory of optimal psychological
functioning.156 It is a contemporary mix of various themes
owing their origins to a variety of historical figures ranging
from “Socrates and Aristotle, Locke and Adam Smith, Thoreau
and John Stuart Mill, and Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.”157 The
three major psychological values which encompass the
framework of ethical individualism are (a) eudemonism; (b)
personal responsibility; and (c) ethical universality.158 By first
defining and then applying each of these values to the canons
of authorship and originality in copyright, it will be
demonstrated that the individualist underpinnings evident in
the copyright code achieve not only the goal of the Progress
Clause, but also Waterman’s overall humanistic objective of
attaining a synchronistic society.
A. EUDEMONISM
Eudemonism represents all those efforts made by one in
order to know and live in accordance with one’s “true self,” or
the Hellenistic concept of the daimon, which distinguishes each
individual from all others.159 Although eudemonism is named
after the Greek word we translate as “happiness,”160 it is better
described by Waterman as “the pursuit of the best of which the
person is capable.”161 Because acting consistently with one’s
true potential requires a great deal of effort and discipline, the
accompanying feelings of “rightness” and “strength of purpose”
which are achieved by such acts certainly cannot be construed
as “easy pleasures to achieve.”162 Eudemonism can thus be said
to embrace the “classic Greek virtues of wisdom (or prudence),
self-control (or temperance), and . . . justice.”163 In its “pure
form,” the philosophy envisions “a self-interested kind of ‘know-
156. WATERMAN, PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 5, at 29.
157. Id. at 15.
158. Waterman, Interdependence, supra note 3, at 764.
159. Id.
160. ROBERT J. O’CONNELL, PLATO ON THEHUMAN PARADOX 9 (1997).
161. WATERMAN, PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 5, at 16.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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how’” of the manner in which one’s “happiness can best be
attained and secured.”164
It is a common misperception that eudemonistic principles
are “skewed in favor of the interests of the privileged;”165
however, eudemonism in its proper, classical application is not
characteristic of only “great” men and women, but, rather, it is
a universal goal incumbent upon all humans to achieve in order
to provide both purpose and meaning to their existence.166
While the daimon is achieved when each person individually
strives to enrich his own unique potentials that distinguish him
from everyone else, it also includes “those potentials that are
shared by all humans by virtue of their common
specieshood.”167
By examining the life and writings of recognized
nineteenth century geniuses such as Friedrich Nietzsche, one
can readily observe that the eudemonistic goal of “[t]he role of
genius was a cultural category comprehensible to everyone, a
role that could be learned, and a structure for the psychological
integrity required of a radical innovator.”168 Amazing
opportunities for the common man became achievable for the
first time in human history, as “across Europe and in America
commoners were taking the place of privileged orders.
Bourgeois intellectuals created new roles for themselves as
they declared their independence from clerical careers and
noble patrons, and claimed the right to reform society
according to their own lights.”169 Indeed, “[t]he ideology of
genius encouraged creative heroes to follow their own natural
paths of development, paths that most often ran against the
grain of conventional bourgeois society.”170
Eudemonism is also oft misinterpreted as mere hedonism
or happiness measured by the totality of baser life indulgences
164. O’CONNELL, supra note 160, at 10.
165. Lisa Tessman, Feminist Eudaimonism: Eudaimonism as Non-Ideal
Theory, in FEMINIST ETHICS AND SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY:
THEORIZING THENON-IDEAL 50 (Lisa Tessman ed., 2009).
166. Waterman, Interdependence, supra note 3, at 764; see also WATERMAN,
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 5, at 23 (“Every daimon is worthy of realization.”).
167. Waterman, Interdependence, supra note 3, at 764; see alsoWATERMAN,
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 5, at 23.
168. PLETSCH, supra note 123, at 211.
169. Id. at 1–2.
170. Id. at 7.
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such as eating, drinking, and sex; however, it can be more
accurately observed that
eudemonism means by happiness not merely the sum total of
sensual pleasures but also—and rather—nonsensual pleasures,
more refined, more noble, more lasting, and less fragile. In this sense
it is neither mainly nor predominantly sensual and carnal, nor is it
aimed at the passing moment only. It has a longer perspective of
time in its evaluation of pleasure, and for this reason views
happiness as a conscientious system of living and not a mere hunt
for transient enjoyment.171
Similarly, eudemonia, also commonly referred to as the
“good life,” has been described by one author as a “higher-order
good” or a “regulatory ideal,” in that one can flourish best only
when successfully striking a balance of all the pursuits that
make life worthwhile and enjoying them in the right relation to
each other.172 Invariably, then, if one focuses solely or even
primarily on base pleasures to the exclusion of other attributes
or virtues, one misses out on great portions of what the “good
life” contemplates.173 Moreover, pursuing eudemonia can be
quite difficult and painful as it “is inextricably tied with the
excellent transformation of the whole character or person,” yet
is not dependent upon, or equivalent to, transient life-
circumstances such as wealth, honor or pleasure.174
Applying the principles of eudemonia specifically to the
concept of creativity, one professor of philosophy has observed
that “[t]he highest form of creative work involves the breaking
of new ground in a subject, novelty that grows out of
established knowledge and skills, but which transcends them.
At best this may provide a radical new idea of the criteria for
excellence in the matter at hand.”175 If the definition of
excellence is “the creative advance of humans,” or the “the
171. PITIRIM ALEKSANDROVIČ SOROKIN, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL DYNAMICS:
A STUDY OF CHANGE IN MAJOR SYSTEMS OF ART, TRUTH, ETHICS, LAW AND
SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS 416 (1962).
172. LAURA V. SIEGAL, PHILOSOPHY AND ETHICS: NEW RESEARCH 279–80
(2006).
173. Id.
174. BRENDAN COOK, PURSUING EUDEMONIA: RE-APPROPRIATING THE
GREEK PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE CHRISTIAN APOPHATIC
TRADITION 25 (2013).
175. M.J. NEWBY, EUDAIMONIA: HAPPINESS IS NOT ENOUGH 82 (2011); see
also R. Anthony Reese, What Copyright Owes the Future, 50 HOUS. L. REV.
287, 289 (2012) (“In the realm of artistic creation, when an author draws on
what has come before, perhaps the author and the audience can not only see a
little further, but understand and feel a little more deeply.”).
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movement from what is already in existence,”176 then Norton
well describes the eudemonistic phenomenon as the “principle
of the complementarity of excellences” in that it “affirms that
every genuine excellence benefits by every other genuine
excellence. It means that the best within every person calls
upon and requires the best within every other person.”177
Ironically, in contrast to the naysayers of individualist theory,
this type of individual excellence unfailingly contributes to the
collective good of the society because although the genius could
be “recognized as a hero whose extraordinary journey carried
him far away from the lives of ordinary people” this heroic
journey also “permitted the genius to return to the community
with the fruits of his creative mission.”178
Norton is careful to distinguish the principle of emulation,
which is the “adoption of an exemplified universal or principle,”
from imitation, which is a “replication of particulars.”179 Pure
imitation, as such, will certainly not achieve the constitutional
goals of progress, as would emulation, and the difference lies
between the fact that “[t]o emulate a worthy man is not to re-
live his individual life, but to utilize the principle of worthy
living, exemplified by him, toward the qualitative improvement
of our individual life.”180 He also recognizes the fact that the
attainment of genuine excellence must necessarily proceed in a
hierarchical manner when he claims that
[i]n the cardinal matter of attaining to his excellence the individual
amid his fellows is positioned in a hierarchy, his level of attainment
surpassing that of some persons but being surpassed by that of
others. In this situation his task is twofold: he is to learn from the
176. NIMI WARIBOKO, THE PRINCIPLE OF EXCELLENCE: A FRAMEWORK FOR
SOCIAL ETHICS 28 (2009).
177. NORTON, supra note 138, at 10.
178. PLETSCH, supra note 123, at 212.
179. NORTON, supra note 138, at 12.
180. Id. at 13; see also LUDWIG VON MISES, THE ANTI-CAPITALISTIC
MENTALITY 78 (1956) (“Imitation of masterworks of the past is not art; it is
routine. What gives value to a work is those features in which it differs from
other works.”); Carys J. Craig, Reconstructing the Author-Self: Some Feminist
Lessons for Copyright Law, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 207, 212–13
(2007) (“At the heart of the Romantic ideal is the sanctity of individual
creativity. The distinction between imitation and originality is therefore
intricately tied to the perceived nature of man, such that true authorship
represents the essence of human individuality. The human agent, as author,
does not copy without sacrificing his authenticity and obscuring his intrinsic
worth.”).
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example of those above him, and at the same time he is by his own
example to teach those beneath.181
Individual excellence also requires “accurate self-
knowledge” and personal confidence, as “the individual who is
confident of his own worth does not feel threatened by the
worthiness of others but, on the contrary, acutely perceives
such worthiness and generously acknowledges it.”182
Moreover, the “complementary of excellences” in creative
endeavors seems to be contagious and self-perpetuating, in that
“the great pedagogical principle of the emulation of example is
rooted in the fact that the manifestation of worth by any
individual activates like inclinations (albeit of very different
strengths) in those individuals who witness the manifestation
and recognize the worth.”183
In applying the principles of eudemonia and excellence to
the concept of originality in copyright law, then, a welcomed,
alternative interpretation of the “on the shoulders of giants”
(OTSG) metaphor can be understood. Whereas OTSG is
commonly utilized by copyright defendants as a justification for
the unauthorized use—and oftentimes, mere imitation—of
plaintiff’s copyrighted work by insisting that all authors borrow
from past works in order to create and that no work is “strictly
new and original throughout,”184 a eudemonistic and, thus,
individualistic stance would alternatively recognize the
multifarious new builders and praise and reward them for their
unique and original contributions to works that had been
authored in the past. Since no two individual authors can ever
be exactly alike, this view of the OTSG metaphor would
embrace the notion of copyright ownership, as long as the work
is actually created by the author and is original. Not
surprisingly, these are the two standards already employed to
determine the legal requirements of copyright ownership!185
Instead of bemoaning that the BBECs are economically
benefiting to the detriment of members of the general public
who are denied the ability to copy and regurgitate previous
181. NORTON, supra note 138, at 12.
182. Id. at 11.
183. Id. at 13.
184. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int’l, 740 F. Supp.
37, 77 (D. Mass. 1990).
185. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991)
(“[O]riginality requires independent creation plus a modicum of creativity.”).
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works, we can celebrate the fact that the BBECs have the
proper infrastructure and resources that allow them to
disseminate and provide access to more works to more of the
public.186 Most importantly, because copyright can never be
secured for mere facts, ideas, and concepts, new authors are
invariably required to imprint their own individual viewpoint
upon all that material in which they claim ownership.187
Professor Bloom characterizes this type of genius-creation
as “fierce originality,” which, although similar to the OTSG
metaphor, would never deny the originality implicit in new,
great works of authorship.188 Fierce originality recognizes that
a new artist must “come[] to terms with [his] precursors,” by
recognizing that his consciousness is “shaped by all the
consciousnesses [sic] that he imagined,” yet it also beautifully
acknowledges that “[g]enius, by necessity invokes the
transcendental and the extraordinary, because it is fully
conscious of them. Consciousness is what defines genius:
Shakespeare, like his Hamlet, exceeds us in consciousness, goes
beyond the highest order of consciousness that we are capable
of knowing without him.”189
Professor Bloom’s alternate—eudemonistic—definitionof
genius would return us as a society that, instead of
depreciating or envying (and whole-cloth copying) those
“exceptional individuals” who have come before us and created
for us, we would appreciate them, with gratitude, and strive to
be more like them. He elaborates:
By “appreciation,” I mean something more than “adequate esteem.”
Need also enters into it, in the particular sense of turning to the
genius of others in order to redress a lack in oneself, or finding in
genius a stimulus to one’s own powers, whatever these may emerge
as being. Appreciation may modulate into love, even as your
consciousness of a dead genius augments consciousness itself. Your
solitary self’s deepest desire is for survival, whether in the here and
now, or transcendentally elsewhere. To be augmented by the genius
186. Vineet Kaul, New Media Part 1: Redfining Journalism, COMPUTERS IN
ENT. (2017), https://cie.acm.org/articles/new-media-redefining-journalism/
(“TV and radio, the Internet is also a storehouse of knowledge providing access
to huge pile of information.”).
187. See Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1368 (5th
Cir. 1981) (“If . . . the expression of the idea necessarily follows from the idea
to such an extent that the idea is capable of expression only in a more or less
stereotyped form, it is not copyrightable.”).
188. BLOOM, supra note 133, at 11.
189. Id. at 11–12.
616 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 18:2
of others is to enhance the possibilities of survival, at least in the
present and the near future.190
Undoubtedly utilizing the principle of eudemonism, the
Framers intended that our society would so ingratiate our
genius-authors by providing them with the incentive of
exclusive ownership to the fruits of their creation, the thought
being that such control would beget more and more creative
works for the enjoyment and edification of the society as a
whole.191 Most critics of the doctrine of exclusive copyright
ownership focus solely on deconstructing the economic benefits
of that mechanism;192 however, as will be further discussed in
the next Section, I submit that the Framers also acknowledged
the important psychological benefit of personal responsibility
and control over one’s life that inures to owners who are
allowed to govern their creations in the manner in which they
see most fit.
B. PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Eudemonistic feelings can only be achieved when one’s life
outcomes are significantly perceived as being under one’s
personal control.193 One must be able to make choices
particularly regarding the goals constituting the central
organizing principles of one’s life.194 The more that individuals
are responsibly able to choose their own circumstances, the
more they are able to feel self-determined and self-confident,
which invariably leads to “success in eudemonistic
undertakings.”195 Contrarily, if the events occurring in one’s life
are perceived as largely beyond one’s control or influence, a
sense of personal responsibility for either positive or negative
outcomes will not be present.196 Under such circumstances,
190. BLOOM, supra note 133, at 5.
191. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432
(1984) (“The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for
an ‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”).
192. Jodie Griffin, The Economic Benefits of Copyright, PUB. KNOWLEDGE,
https://www.publicknowledge.org/files/TPP%20Econ%20Presentation.pdf (last
visited Feb. 6, 2017) (“Increasing copyright enforcement and protection does
not always lead to economic benefits.”).
193. WATERMAN, PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 5, at 21.
194. Id. at 22.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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“self-attribution of credit and blame do not make sense”197 and
“feelings of helplessness, apathy, depression, or resignation are
likely consequences.”198
According to the Greeks, real happiness is truly a
subjective matter of personal choice;199 however, a moral,
virtuous and, thus, eudemonic life can only be led when one
employs one’s sense of both reason and personal
responsibility.200 Eudemonistic teachings were concerned with
studying the good and bad traits present in human character,
and using reason as a tool as opposed to appealing to “religion,
authority, or tradition.”201 Indeed, an impersonal and collective
government simply does not have the ability to effectuate the
rational and private outcomes intended by each individual
creator in the process of his production.
Applying the eudemonistic principle of personal
responsibility to copyright, it is apparent that a synergistic
society that consists of “happy” and, therefore, more productive
authors will be ensured when they are able to control and
influence the products of their creation, thus leading to healthy
competition and the innate, inner drive to create more
resources.202 Application of this economically driven incentive
of ownership has the attendant psychological benefits of both
personal satisfaction and ultimate cooperation among the
collective. As one group of contemporary economists further
explain,
[w]ell-defined property rights tie people to the way assets are used.
Ownership is an important factor in making people responsible for
the outcome of their action or inaction. Furthermore, private
ownership ensures in a way like nothing else can that people bear
the costs of their actions. People who own their assets—their
intellectual skills or their land—will themselves have to bear the
cost of their behavior in terms of the reduced value and productivity
of their assets.203
197. WATERMAN, PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 5, at 21.
198. Waterman, Interdependence, supra note 3, at 765.
199. SMITH, supra note 127, at 202–03 (“Remember that eudaimonia must
be self-generated. This entails that no amount of third-party engineering could
‘rig’ its achievement for anyone.”) (emphasis in original).
200. Richa Yadav, Virtue Ethics, in ETHICS: A UNIVERSITY GUIDE 289–90
(Richard H. Corrigan & Mary E. Farrell eds., 2010).
201. Id. at 290.
202. JAMES A. DORN ET AL., THE REVOLUTION IN DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMICS 120 (1998).
203. Id. at 119.
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On the other hand, if intellectual ownership is displaced to
an amorphous and loosely defined collective, we will have lost a
great deal with such erosion of the concept of a natural
property right since “[w]ith no personal ownership there is
little personal responsibility for what happens, and even less
incentive to cooperate with others for mutual benefit.”204
Is it reasonable, then, to advocate a copyright system in
which all works that are invariably authored by an individual
are afterwards snatched from them by the government and
owned by the collective? Of course not. The call for open
sharing and common ownership of cultural products that is
today the trend of academicians “in which no one in particular
owns anything and somehow we all will own everything and
share it equally”205 is a non-rational delusion with profound
psychological repercussions.206 When it comes to the
intellectual products that result from creations subject to
copyright law, they are owned by either the individual author
who created them, or by somebody else who takes them by
force; there is, indeed “no middle ground, no ‘third way’ in
which ownership is somehow avoided.”207 If either the
government, or some other nebulous collective is deemed to
own and control these personal products, personal
responsibility in and to them is lost, and the less free and the
less productive the authors in such a society will be.208
To the contrary, if we continue to promulgate our existing
copyright system in which works are owned by the individual
author who created them, such authors will have a stake in,
and a personal responsibility for, their works.209 They will
singularly be allowed to profit—whatever personal meaning
that term has for them—in the manner they see fit. Applying
the eudemonistic principle of personal responsibility to
copyright authorship, then, will ensure the connection to and
tenure in the original work created by each individual author.
204. Id.
205. Lawrence W. Reed, Ownership Must Be Tempered by Sharing, in
EXCUSE ME, PROFESSOR: CHALLENGING THE MYTHS OF PROGRESSIVISM 65
(Lawrence W. Reed ed., 2015)
206. Id. at 66–69.
207. Id. at 66.
208. Id.
209. See id. at 66 (stating that “ownership is both a virtue and a necessity.
What is yours, you tend to husband”).
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C. ETHICALUNIVERSALITY
Eudemonism necessarily entails the ability of the
individual to live in harmony, not only with himself, but also
with his entire community.210 Ethical universality can thus be
viewed as the limiting principle of applying eudemonistic
qualities to individual pursuits in that it denotes three sub-
principles which actually serve to limit personal behavior in
certain ways: (i) freedom of choice; (ii) justice as equity; and (iii)
respect for the integrity of others.211
1. Freedom of Choice
Although ethical individualism advocates eudemonistic
choice which is universal to all individuals, it nonetheless
implies a recognition that such rights are not unlimited and
must recognize the freedom of others to achieve their own
personal goals and aspirations.212 The action characteristic for
this synergistic behavior is voluntary association and exchange
with no elements of fraud or force.213 If, during a human
exchange, there exists an outcome that is not in proportion to
the nature and extent of its respective input, an “unequal
relative gain[]” will result, leading to a “subjective discomfort”
and increased feelings that one is being manipulated by
others.214 Here, Adam Smith’s capitalistic notion of the
marketplace as having an “invisible hand” can be realized to
the greatest extent whenever each person works to his own
end, invariably “working for the interests of all.”215 Ayn Rand’s
thinking can be similarly described, she believed that
[f]or Objectivists wealth is not a fixed pool but a dynamic inventory
achieved by producers in proportion to the creative value they
deliver into the economy. The producers who contribute value should
have a right to the value of their own production. How can that be
210. Yadav, supra note 200, at 290.
211. WATERMAN, PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 5, at 23.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 24.
214. Waterman, Interdependence, supra note 3, at 766.
215. Id. For a concise explanation of Adam Smith’s ideology of the
“invisible hand,” see Tim Kasser, Capitalism and Autonomy, in HUMAN
AUTONOMY IN CROSS-CULTURAL CONTEXT: PERSPECTIVES ON THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF AGENCY, FREEDOM, AND WELL-BEING 191, 191–206 (Valery I.
Chirkov et al. eds., 2010) (analyzing capitalism’s “psychological claim that
freedom is maximized when people are encouraged to pursue their own self-
interest and when social actors compete with each other with minimal
governmental restraint”).
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unfair when, after all, any value is assigned in a free market only by
the voluntary choice of customers who deal—or not—with a
producer?216
If the fruits of copyright are owned by the collective,
invariably no voluntary exchange can exist.217 Collective
ownership will arise by force once any work is fixed in a
tangible medium of expression and the author of the work will
be bereft of control and, more importantly, bereft of spirit.
Indeed, if there exists “no personal ownership there is little
personal responsibility for what happens, and even less
incentive to cooperate with others for mutual benefit.”218 Such
a collective climate then, necessarily breeds the type of
malicious and dangerous envy over the property interests of
others, as discussed in detail in Part IV of this article. But as
President Abraham Lincoln eloquently admonished, when this
envy is left unchecked, it will flourish and, ironically, the
enviers will become the envied in a never-ending cycle of
psychological regression which will lead to a further lack of
freedom of choice:
Property is the fruit of labor—property is desirable—is a positive
good in the world. That some should be rich, shows that others may
become rich, and hence is just encouragement to industry and
enterprise. Let not him who is houseless pull down the house of
another; but let him labor diligently and build one for himself, thus
by example assuring that his own shall be safe from violence when
built.219
Although President Lincoln’s statement relates to real
property ownership, the same psychological underpinnings
apply to ownership in intellectual property goods which, when
snatched by the envious from their creator, will inevitably lead
to a broken sense of individual pride, achievement, and spirit.
216. DONALD L. LUSKIN & ANDREW GRETA, I AM JOHN GALT: TODAY’S
HEROIC INNOVATORS BUILDING THE WORLD AND THE VILLAINOUS PARASITES
DESTROYING IT 11 (2011) (“Risks are borne by those who take them; players
don’t gamble with other peoples’ chips and expect someone else to pay for their
losses; nor do they take someone else’s winnings. Benefits accrue to those who
practice clean dealings and meet true market needs with value-added
products or services.”).
217. See REED, supra note 205, at 68.
218. DORN ET AL., supra note 202, at 119–20.
219. HENRY JARVIS RAYMOND & FRANCIS BICKNELL CARPENTER, THE LIFE
AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN . . . : TOGETHER WITH HIS STATE
PAPERS, INCLUDING HIS SPEECHES, ADDRESSES, MESSAGES LETTERS, AND
PROCLAMATION, AND THE CLOSING SCENES CONNECTED WITH HIS LIFE AND
DEATH 500 (1865).
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To the contrary, a “unity of purpose” is present with
individual ownership of intellectual assets driven by both self-
purpose and profit motivation that simply does not exist in a
collective ownership model.220 When creators are provided with
ownership of their works and the ability to consciously trade
them in the market according to their freedom of choice, it also
imbues in them the ability to provide for themselves as opposed
to being reliant on the collective; and, importantly, it “means
living with the consequences of our actions—reaping the gain
from favorable outcomes while shouldering the loss from
downside risks.”221 When viewed from this lens, it is difficult to
begrudge the great successes and resultant riches of businesses
such as the BBECs, who also eat the losses for those
intellectual products that do not find merit in the
marketplace.222 If some sort of ephemeral collective were to
own the copyright in the Star Wars story, would there be any
incentive for any writer, producer, director, toy maker, movie
star, etc. to engage in the risky business of bringing such a
creative enterprise to market?
2. Justice as Equity
This concept dovetails nicely with the Freedom of Choice
principle in that, in order for ethical individualism to thrive,
there must exist a concept of justice that is defined as equity, in
which the outcomes to the participants are proportional to the
nature and extent of their respective inputs.223 The behavioral
system must be adjusted so that when one feels that the
benefits derived from a joint venture are incommensurately
distributed, one may opt out of participation in such
exchange.224 Indeed, any social arrangement which advocates
for the distribution of justice, wealth, or collective, unearned
220. DORN ET AL., supra note 202, at 120.
221. LUSKIN& GRETA, supra note 216, at 10.
222. See DORN ET AL., supra note 202, at 114 (“Unless property rights are
transferable we cannot shift resources from lower-to higher-valued uses.
Property rights should be partitionable; it should be possible to divide up the
collection of rights that goes with any particular element of property. In this
way property may be used economically for a wide range of different purposes
under differing circumstances.”).
223. WATERMAN, PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 5, at 24–25.
224. Id. at 25.
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benefits is “incompatible with each of the universalizable [sic]
principles associated with ethical individualism.”225
Despite the obviousness of this principle, we are told over
and again by prominent authors and academicians that the
tenets of copyright law that allow for exclusive ownership in
the products of original and ingenious works of art by those
individuals who create them will inevitably lead to an
upsetting of “social justice” and “equality.”226 Vague terms such
as these—and particularly usage of the term “distributive
justice” when discussing the purpose of copyright in modern
society—while quite catchy and attractive to those who
populate our progressive, multiculturalist academy,227 seem
never to be defined by the professors who use them in order to
support their claims.
The meaning of “equality” from the perspective of ethical
universalism, on the other hand, is readily defined as derived
from the original interpretation as intended by the Framers,
and is not meant to be used as a convenient way to justify
socialistic practices of wealth and property redistribution:
Equality means having an equal starting point or an equal chance; it
does not mean that the outcome will be equal. Interpreting equality
as equal outcome creates a lot of trouble. If those who worked hard
and those who did not were to receive equal treatment, as
communism insists they should, in the end it would be only natural
for no one to want to work hard any more. If, after accumulating
wealth through hard work, you were criticized for wrongdoing, for
instance, accused of cheating to make a profit, you would lose all
enthusiasm and stop making an effort.228
When copyright critics accuse BBEC’s over and again of
copyright greed or corporate injustice when, in actuality, they
are perfectly following the Copyright code, it seems apparent
that eventually they, like the individual authors themselves,
225. Id.
226. See, e.g., CRISTINA FLESHER FOMINAYA, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND
GLOBALIZATION: HOW PROTESTS, OCCUPATIONS AND UPRISINGS ARE
CHANGING THE WORLD 135–37 (2014) (quoting a manifesto written by Aaron
Swartz which states, in part, “[t]he world’s entire scientific and cultural
heritage, published over centuries in books and journals, is increasingly being
digitized and locked up by a handful of private corporations”).
227. Daniel Benoliel, Copyright Distributive Injustice, 10 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 45, 47–48 (2007) (“An examination of the academic literature and
copyright litigation reveals that distributive justice arguments are appearing
with greater frequency and receiving greater deference in copyright
jurisprudence.”).
228. OKAWA, supra note 104, at 28.
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will tire of the universal castigation and opt out. Again, who is
it that will ensure that the masses can sit in an air-conditioned
theater eating popcorn and enjoying the next Star Wars movie?
Will George Lucas himself have to distribute and market his
own work? Would not his time be better spent creating the
next-to-the-next Star Wars movie?
3. Respect for the Integrity of Others
The principle of respect for the integrity of others implies
one’s ability to treat each person as an end and not a means,
and “viewing others as possessing a dignity comparable to one’s
own.”229 As the philosopher Isaiah Berlin wrote in 1958, “But to
manipulate men, to propel them toward goals which you—the
social reformers—see, but they may not, is to deny their human
essence, to treat them as objects without wills of their own, and
therefore to degrade them.”230 Treating others, especially
authors, with dignity invariably necessitates an
acknowledgement of the vast diversity among humans
regarding the ethical forms in which such dignity may be
expressed, and a realization that one does not live in a
vacuum.231 In this respect, universality does not necessarily
mean uniformity, since no two persons wish to be treated
identically the same.232 The ability to have respect for the
autonomy of another requires “the psychological process of
empathy or social role taking” and a keen ability to place
oneself in the position of others, and “within their phenomenal
frame of reference.”233 Moreover, respecting the rights of others
does not necessitate giving up one’s own rights, as “[a] person
cannot sacrifice what is not hers. Since rights protect the
freedom that a person is entitled to, respecting rights exacts no
loss from those who do so.”234
In this manner, it is easy to understand that abiding by
the eudemonistic principle of respecting others’ rights is
ultimately in the interests of all persons, since their rights will
229. WATERMAN, PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 5, at 24.
230. Lawrence W. Reed, Humanity Can Be Best Understood in a Collective
Context, in EXCUSE ME, PROFESSOR: CHALLENGING THE MYTHS OF
PROGRESSIVISM, supra note 205, at 80.
231. WATERMAN, PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 5, at 24.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. SMITH, supra note 127, at 70.
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reciprocally be respected, and nobody’s rights will be sacrificed
for the sake of others.235 To the contrary, when there exists a
movement in society which serves to degrade and demoralize
the individual human spirit, and “occurs systematically and is
intended to cause humiliation and denigration, the violation of
human dignity is particularly grave.”236 When such virulent
propaganda is left unchecked, and persons continue to be
treated as objects or as mere means to an end that primarily
serves the needs of others, the eudemonistic principle of dignity
is misappropriated, and it “not only violates the dignity of those
under attack but also the dignity of those it seeks to
influence.”237 When this process consists of systematic
persecution, “the human dignity of those under attack is
violated in an irreversible, most fundamental and final way,”
and is particularly the case where it is supported by state
institutions or “similarly powerful group[s].”238
Applying this concept to copyright authorship, then, it is
apparent that the dignity with which authors should be treated
is drastically compromised by the charges of academicians that
Romantic authorship is dead and there are no geniuses.
Whereas most European copyright laws recognize the personal
and individual integrity of authors who create original works
by providing them with a moral right, or droit moral, in the
products of their creation, the U.S. Copyright Act, in large part,
has no counterpart.239 The recognition of moral rights in
copyrighted works goes beyond the basic protection of economic
rights and is grounded in a natural rights theory that authors
deserve protection not only for the economic value of the
product of their work that can be bought and sold in the
235. Id. at 70–71.
236. WIBKE K. TIMMERMANN, INCITEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 47–48
(2014).
237. Id. at 49.
238. Id. at 52–53.
239. Robert C. Bird, Moral Rights: Diagnosis and Rehabilitation, 46 AM.
BUS. L.J. 407, 410–14 (2009). The moral rights doctrine was recognized in
Europe in 1928 by the Berne Convention. Article 6bis of the Berne Convention
states,
[i]ndependently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or
other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the
said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
Id.
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marketplace, but also for the personality, identity, and
“creative soul” that invariably exists within the intellectual
works they create.240 Although the notion of moral rights has
support in the United States, to the anti-Romantic-authorship
scholars like Professor Lessig, the concept “represents yet
another way of extending and expanding copyright law to
protect authors and creators in a way in which the law was
never intended to operate.”241
Regardless of whether one believes that full legal moral
rights should be extended to American authors, the more
problematic issue is the denial of the underlying philosophical
rights that are represented by the doctrine. When a society
does not metaphysically respect the dignity and autonomy of
authors and their right to make a living from their trade in the
same manner that it assumes that lawyers, scientists, teachers,
and workers in virtually every profession should be paid for
their services, it becomes a system that will not synergistically
encourage people to work in the creative field. If we accept that
respect for the integrity of others is a tenet that needs to be
followed in order for the members of society to flourish, then we
certainly would not claim that the economic fruits of
intellectual creation be denied to authors while we gladly pay
professionals in other fields for the fruits of their labor. But
that, indeed, is what anti-author proponents suggest when they
attempt to prove over and again by largely nebulous and
unsupported research that authors would continue to pursue
their artistic careers in a world where copyright law did not
exist or where creators were rewarded in non-monetary
ways.242
240. Id. at 410.
241. Christopher Madden, Hold on Tighter/let Go Sooner: A Review of Free
Culture and an Argument for the Synthesis of Public Domain Preservation and
Moral Rights Adoption, 15 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART& ENT. L. 99, 102 (2004).
242. See, e.g., Jiarui Liu, Copyright for Blockheads: An Empirical Study of
Market Incentive and Intrinsic Motivation, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467, 533
(2015) (“[T]he majority of musicians appear to create music simply for music’s
sake . . . .”); Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace
Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 546, 538–39 (2009) (“Creators
speak of compulsion, joy, and other emotions and impulses that have little to
do with monetary incentives. . . . Instead of monetary rewards or even artistic
control of how works are transmitted to others as our highest value, we should
aim for policies that maximize participation-even when that changes the mix
of economic winners and losers.”); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as
Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 29, 54
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In fact, if one reads professorial accounts such as these
closely, one can also detect the perfidious underlying presence
of “copyright envy” as analyzed in Part II of this article. For
example, Professor Diane Leenheer Zimmerman explains a
recent article of hers as: “an investigation of the assumption in
the United States that the law of copyright, by dangling
monetary and other economic ‘carrots’ before people already
endowed by virtue of their backgrounds and innate ability to be
creative (however we define that word), is what induces them
to actualize their potential.”243 Translation: Because these
great artists grew up in an environment where they were
educated and disciplined enough to hone in on their abilities to
be creative, this is quite enough for them, already! But on top of
all this, they actually expect to be paid for these services to
society? Phhhhish!
Following suit, Professor Jiarui Liu, while acknowledging
that “the merits of this proposed copyright-free world vis-à-vis
the current copyright regime have yet to be seriously examined
from an empirical perspective,”244 nonetheless proclaims that
her research “focusing on real-world artists”245 shows that
musicians typically do not make their decisions on whether to
continue creating music based upon the availability and scope of
copyright protection. It appears that the majority of the musicians
do not make a conscious effort to pursue the economic benefits
provided by copyright. Their music creations are mostly motivated
by the emotional benefits including self-expression, communication,
peer respect and popularity.246
Professor Liu, thus, concludes that “a world without copyright
law could actually benefit the public as a whole. Consumers
would have greater access to low-price intellectual products
and artists would continue to create for intrinsic motivations
such as self-expression, communication and reputation.”247
Translation: Artists will create this great stuff for us
because their intrinsic human spirit compels them to express
themselves, and the rest of society, by reinforcing this notion,
(2011) (“Truly creative people respond most strongly to some innate drive to
solve problems or to produce art and are unlikely to be encouraged to make a
greater effort by the promise of profit if their work is successful.”).
243. Zimmerman, supra note 242, at 30.
244. Liu, supra note 242, at 471.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 533.
247. Id. at 470–71
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can free-ride and benefit from their works. Since we lawyers, in
our infinite wisdom, have non-empirically determined that
artists will create for loosely interpreted non-economic reasons,
why bother to compensate them when we can get it all for free
or, at least, at a very low price?
These accounts represent a small sampling of the arrogant
and ill-researched propaganda that is being proliferated by our
copyright academy, and accepted over and again without
criticism or translation. To the contrary, I would submit that,
even if one day a definitive, empirical study proves without an
iota of doubt that artists are primarily motivated by non-
monetary incentives, they should nonetheless be compensated
for the product of their work, which is a commodity used and
valued by others. If we respect the dignity of authors, why
would we not want to compensate them for products they
create and we enjoy?
Copyright law is intended to protect the authors of original
works, but
beyond protecting the author’s exclusive rights to the work (and the
resulting economic benefits that may accrue), [copyright law] may
also be the manner in which that author gains a stable sense of self
and an identity that he or she can corroborate by identifying and
claiming ownership to an authored text(s).248
Sadly, if the anti-author stories that fail to recognize this
important human necessity of self-identity and self-ownership
continue to persist in our society—if the dignity of the
individual authorial process is consistently debased and
sacrificed for the sake of the “public as a whole”—we will have
lost a major component of what Waterman and other
behavioral psychologists consider essential in a synergistic
society.
CONCLUSION
“Everyone who enjoys supposes that the tree was concerned with the
fruit,
but it was really concerned with the seed.
248. Linda Rolin Danil, Deconstructing Copyright, CRITICAL LEGAL
THINKING (Apr. 8, 2013), http://criticallegalthinking.com/2013/04/08/decon
structing-copyright.
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In this lies the difference between all those who create and those who
enjoy.” Friedrich Nietzsche249
Although “[e]very age, and every culture, has its heroes of
the mind,”250 we are fast embarking upon a future age in which
the Romantic author-hero is universally nonexistent. Although
we enjoy being entertained and educated by the works of our
great author-heroes, we are becoming desensitized and unable
to both comprehend and appreciate the vast amounts of labor,
risk, and heart and soul that is necessary in order to create
such works for our ultimate enjoyment. Regardless of the fact
that most copyright professors would laud this paradigmatic
sea-change that serves to both legally and philosophically
disengage the author from his work, I believe that a true
synergistic copyright regime necessitates the type of individual
ownership as originally conceived by our first copyright laws,
and which continues to persist today.
I have attempted in this article to provide a construct
within which to argue that viewing copyright ownership with a
collective lens, with all of its resultant anti-authorship trope,
amounts to a nihilistic society that is less creatively inspired,
less enriched and, ultimately if not ironically, less collectively
happy. This is due primarily to the fact that
anti-individualism or communitarianism . . . comes to no more than
the special privilege of certain individuals to run the lives of other
individuals, to live off the lives of others who may very well have
perfectly justified goals of their own that could be supported with
their lives if they were left free to decide about such matters.251
Although some of the precepts of a collectivist society may
look attractive on paper, many economists agree that a
collectivist system in which the government dictates the
morals, opinions, ownership interests, wealth distributions,
and trade practices has been tried and tested, and has utterly
failed:
Which countries contain the most peaceful, the most moral, and the
happiest people? Those people are found in the countries where the
law least interferes with private affairs; where the government is
least felt; where the individual has the greatest scope, and free
249. Quotations from Friedrich Nietzsche, POEMHUNTER.COM, http://www
.poemhunter.com/quotations/famous.asp?people=friedrich%20nietzsche&p=60
(last visited Mar. 10, 2017).
250. MCMAHON, supra note 124, at 1.
251. Machan, Collectivists’ Nemesis, supra note 25.
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opinion the greatest influence; where the administrative powers are
fewest and simplest; where taxes are lightest and most nearly
equal; . . . where individuals and groups most actively assume their
responsibilities, and, consequently, where the morals of . . . human
beings are constantly improving; where trade, assemblies, and
associations are the least restricted; . . . where mankind most nearly
follows its own natural inclinations; in short, the happiest, more
moral, and the most peaceful people are those who most nearly
follow this principle: although mankind is not perfect, still, all hope
rests upon the free and voluntary actions of persons within the
limits of right; law or force is to be used for nothing except the
administration of universal justice.252
The irony is that when one is left to nurture, craft, and
own one’s unique creative endeavors, a synergy among
individuals and the group emerges; as the individual
demonstrates and shares his talents with the group, he is
honored and recognized by the group for them, and a mutually
beneficial cycle of creation occurs, leading to a happier, more
synergistic society.253 Rising from this synergy emerges a
vibrant social order where not only is individual expression
protected and respected, but also the collective public is served
by being able to make informed decisions after having been
exposed to a broad and rich depository of original works of
authorship.254
At least a small handful of scholars are brave enough to
openly recognize that “some of the arguments offered in
opposition to traditional notions of authorship and originality
defy sound philosophical reasoning,”255 and that “[e]very
intellectual object such as a book or poem must have an
efficient cause—it could not come into existence on its own.
When a product originates through a human agent’s
intellectual labor, its efficient cause is that agent.”256 Professor
Merges claims proudly that “individual creators are for me the
genuine impetus behind IP law.”257 Well aware of the fact that
he is among the few in the academy who defend traditional
copyright precepts, he nonetheless states
252. See Billings & Reed, supra note 17 (quoting nineteenth-century
French economist Frederic Bastiat).
253. Sechin, supra note 34, at 118 (“The more one asserts one’s
individuality, the more it disappears; and the more one asserts one’s function
in the group, the more one’s individuality emerges.”).
254. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 35, at 1047.
255. See SPINELLO& BOTTIS, supra note 46, at 127
256. Id. at 129.
257. MERGES, supra note 12, at 71.
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I also believe that IP policy has a special obligation to promote and
encourage creatives. Without the efforts of people devoted full-time
to developing and expressing their considerable creative talents, and
the large-scale organizations often needed to assemble their
individual contributions into sophisticated, refined, and polished
form, I believe our collective culture would suffer enormously.258
Professor Jane Ginsburg has similarly stated that the bulk
of copyright law only makes sense when the centrality of the
human creator—the author—is recognized.259 Others have
rightly observed that, despite the fact that the death of the
author motif, as originally proffered by literary critics, has
made its way into the articles of copyright scholars, “there is
plenty of evidence that copyright law continues to employ the
rhetoric and conceptual underpinnings of authorship, in both
the judicial and legislative arena.”260
Professor Wendy Gordon has aptly noted that, with respect
to copyright law, “the U.S. Constitution speaks not only of a
goal—Progress—but also of a means: grants of exclusive rights
to authors and inventors. The burden of persuasion rests on
those who would dislodge copyright from its explicit and
traditional focus.”261
Teetering on the lone fringes of this premise, well outside
the comfortable circle in which stand most of my academic
colleagues who proclaim that collectivity and cultural
collaboration are the new norms of copyright authorship that
eventually will, and should, replace the exclusive rights of
authors, I myself have not been so persuaded. Thus, too, am I
far from convinced that the Romantic author is or should be
dead. As Professor Bloom gloriously acclaims, “the dead genius
is more alive than we are . . . . We read in search of more life,
and only genius can make that available to use.”262 Read on,
my friends!
258. Id. at 223 (emphasis in original).
259. Ginsburg, supra note 42, at 1068.
260. Lionel Bentley, Copyright and the Death of the Author in Literature
and Law, 57 MOD. L. REV. 973, 977 (1994).
261. Gordon, The Core of Copyright, supra note 27, at 677; see also Shapiro,
supra note 35, at 1045 (“Even when balanced with conflicting social interests,
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individual expression.”).
262. BLOOM, supra note 133, at 4.
